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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows: 
7th Apri/1983- SHAPE, Casteau 
Major General Tabary, Belgian Army, ACOS Logistics; 
Mr. Jonathan Stoddart, Minister, Special Assistant for International Affairs; 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Terry, RAF, Deputy SACEUR; 
Lieutenant General Cacciola, DCOS Logistics; 
Colonel Fox, USAF, DCOS Intelligence; 
Mr. Pozzi, Italian civilian, strategic analyst; 
Air Vice' Marshal J. Gilbert, RAF, ACOS Policy. 
8th Apri/1983- NATO, Brussels 
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General Lewis Meiner, United States Army, Deputy Chairman, Military Committee; 
H.E. Mr. Tapley Bennett, Ambassador, United States Permanent Representative; Mr. Savage; 
Dr. Joseph Luns, Secretary-General; 
H.E. Sir John Graham, Ambassador, United Kingdom Permanent Representative; Mr. Colin Bal-
mer; Admiral Sir Anthony Morton, United Kingdom Military Representative; 
H.E. Dr. H. Wieck, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many; Dr. A. Boeker, Minister; 
H. E. Mr. Jean-Marie Merillon, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France. 
lith Apri/1983- Bonn 
Ministry of Defence: 
Mr. Manfred Worner, Minister of Defence; 
Mr. Lothar Riihl, Minister of State for Defence; 
General Tandecki, Fiihrung Stab III; Colonel Rode; Colonel Weige; Colonel Wieland; Colonel 
Flasse; Colonel Ertmann; Colonel Siebert; Colonel Lingan; Colonel Vorwerck. 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs: 
Dr. W. Hofmann, Director of Atlantic Alliance and Defence Affairs. 
12th Apri/1983- Ministry of Defence, London 
Mr. David Fisher, DSI; 
Mr. David Wilson, DS 12. 
19th Apri/1983- Headquarters CINCHAN and COMEASTLANT, Northwood 
Rear Admi.ral Propper, Royal Netherlands Navy, Chief of Staff; 
Captain Morin, Belgian Navy. 
The committee as a whole met at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on Monday, 14th February 
1983, when it discussed a draft outline of the present report. 
It met subsequently in the United States from 21st to 30th March where, in the United Nations, 
New York, it was briefed by Mr. Jan Martenson, United Nations Under-Secretary General, Depart-
ment for Disarmament; Mr. Brian Urquhart, United Nations Under-Secretary General for Political 
Affairs; Mr. Charles Lichtenstein, United States Deputy Representative to the Security Council. In 
Washington it met with Mr. Gerard Smith, former Director of the United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency and Chief Negotiator for SALT I; Mr. George Kennan, former United States 
Ambassador to Moscow; Mr. Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defence. In the State Depart-
ment it was briefed by Mr. Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Richard Burt, 
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs; Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, Director for Politico-Military 
Affairs; Mr. Richard N. Haass, Director, Office of Regional Security Affairs; in the Department of 
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Defence it was briefed by Dr. William E. Hoehn Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence 
for International Security Policy; Mr. Franklin C. Miller, Office of the Secretary of Defence, 
Director for strategic Policy; Mr. Abram Shulsky, Office of the Secretary of Defence, Director for 
Strategic Arms Control Policy; Mr. George W. Heiser, Office of the Secretary of Defence, Theatre 
Nuclear Policy; Lieutenant Colonel Edward A. Hamilton, Joint Chiefs of Staff, International 
Negotiations: Major General Earl G. Peck, Office of the Secretary of Defence (Policy), Director for 
Intelligence and Space Policy; Colonel Kent Montavon, Office of the Secretary of Defence (Inter-
national Security Policy), Director for NATO Affairs; Colonel James L. Gould, Office of the 
Secretary of Defence (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics), Director for Mobilisation Plans and 
Operations; Mr. James W. Morrison, Office of the Secretary of Defence (International Security 
Policy), Director for European Policy. 
The committee then met with Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman of the Defence Subcommittee of 
the Senate Appropriations Committee; and with Mr. Joseph Addabbo, Chairman of the Defence Sub-
committee of the House Appropriations Committee, and the following members of the subcommittee: 
Mr. Les AuCoin; Mr. Norman D. Dicks; Mr. W.G. Hefner; Mr. John P. Murtha; Mr. J. Kenneth 
Robinson. 
In the White House Executive Building the committee was briefed by Mr. Sven Kraemer and 
Colonel Mayer of the National Security Staff. The committee then visited the Patuxent Naval Air 
Test Centre, where it was briefed by the Commander, Rear Admiral E.J. Hogan, and saw the AV-8, 
F/A-18, SH-60B, E2 and P3 aircraft. The committee then visited the Lockheed-California Com-
pany, Los Angeles, where it was briefed by Mr. Ed Cortright, President, and Mr. Ben Rich, in par-
ticular on the TR-1 and SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft. It visited Hughes Aircraft Company and was 
briefed by Mr. George E. Todd, Senior Vice-President, International; Mr. David M. Snyder, Asso-
ciate Director, Middle East and Africa; Mr. Paul H. Kennard, Vice-President and Manager, Advan-
ced Projects Division; Mr. Louis E. Greenbaum, Manager, Communications Systems Division, 
Ground Systems Group; Mr. Leonard Gross, Vice-President, Electro-Optical and Data Systems 
Group; and Mr. Robert L. Roderick, Vice-President, Missile Systems Group, on various aspects of 
the company's activities; visited the Douglas Aircraft Company where it was briefed by Mr. E. Cur-
tis, Senior Vice-President, Fiscal Management; Colonel John Patterson, United States Air Force Plant 
Representative; Mr. L.J. Colapietro, Manager, Government Customer Relations; Mr. E.A. Chambers, 
Manager, Government Marketing, and Mr. D.C. Caldwell, Programme Manager, T -45TS Pro-
gramme, in particular on the VTXTS, C-17 and KC-1 0. 
At the United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, the committee was received by the 
Superintendant, Major General Robert E. Kelley, and Captain Crowley, USAF. The committee 
then visited NORAD Cheyenne Mountain Complex, where it was received by Lieutenenant General 
Kenneth Thorneycroft, Canadian Forces, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and briefed by Major Bob 
Tracy, Major Don Read, Lieutenant Colonel Dick Farkas, and Captain Rick Kniseley. 
The committee then met in the Sala del Consiglio, Pisa, on 3rd May where it discussed a draft of 
the present report, and also visited the Italian Parachute Training School where it was received by 
Colonel Valdimiro Rossi, Commandant. On 4th May it visited the Oto Melara works in La Spezia, 
where it was received by Mr. Fiaccavento, Mr. Ricci, and Mr. Ferrari, and then visited the NATO 
SACLANT ASW Research Centre where it was briefed by the Director Dr. Rolf Goodman and staff. 
The committee met finally in Brussels on 17th May for a joint meeting with the Council under 
the chairmanship of Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations, and on 18th May when 
it discussed and adopted the present report. 
The committee· and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of Congress, 
officials, senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or addressed the committee and 
replied to questions. 
The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee. 
4 
DOCUMENT 947 
Draft Recommendation 
on burden-sharing in the alliance 
The Assembly, 
(1) Recognising that because of its substantial strategic nuclear deterrent and world role the United 
States spends a considerably higher proportion of its national wealth on defence than its European 
allies; 
(il) Appreciating the special contribution to overall deterrence made by the independent nuclear 
forces of France and the United Kingdom; 
(iil) Considering that an important factor in the continuing burden-sharing debate arises from the 
differing approaches of the European allies and the United States administration to relations with the 
Soviet Union, and consequently from the different views on the necessary size and composition of the 
allied defence effort; 
(iv) Believing that these differences call for increased consultation between the European allies on 
strategic policies and defence issues; 
(v) Convinced that within the alliance the political relationship between the European members 
and the United States should reflect more fully their economic, political and defence contributions to 
the security of Western Europe in the fullest sense; 
(vz) Aware that isolationism in the United States is likely to grow to the detriment of western secu-
rity unless the European members of the alliance can convince American public opinion and 
Congress of the adequacy of the European contribution to the NATO defence effort, and unless 
European public opinion and parliaments show reciprocal appreciation of all aspects of the United 
States contribution to allied defence; 
(viz) Welcoming therefore the annual report to Congress by the United States Secretary of Defence 
on allied contributions to the common defence, and statements by Eurogroup which identify the size 
of the European contribution; 
(viiz) Aware of the manifold difficulties of comparing national defence efforts but concluding that the 
European allies for the most part now carry a very reasonable share of the agreed burden, a share 
which has increased from 24% to 38% in the last twenty-five years, and increased most significantly 
in the decade of the 1970s during which the United States effort declined, but believing that certain 
specific improvements in defence efforts are required; 
(ix) Believing that allied defence plans must take account of the possible consequences of develop-
ments beyond the NATO area, and that in the case of such developments which the allies jointly 
recognise as threatening the vital interests of the alliance, the ready assistance of all allies must be 
forthcoming within the area to facilitate United States deployments beyond the area, and in the case 
of certain allies, to participate in such deployments; 
(x) Recalling that problems of common defence and the support of public opinion for national 
defence projects cannot be isolated from the quality of economic, political and monetary relations 
between the United States and the European allies, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
A. Urge member governments concerned within the North Atlantic Council: 
1. To maintain and in the following specific cases improve their defence efforts: 
(a) by maintaining collectively the NATO target of a real increase in defence expenditure in 
real terms as long as the Soviet military build-up continues, and by adhering to the annual 
force goals set by SACEUR; 
(b) by augmenting the combat sustainability of the alliance by providing a minimum of thirty 
days' stocks of fuel, ammunition, spare parts and consumables and by improving the capa-
city of reserve forces; 
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(c) by maximising conventional firepower and ratsmg the nuclear threshold through the 
progressive introduction of proven systems incorporating emerging technologies jointly 
developed and produced on an equitable Atlantic-wide basis; 
(d) by improving the flexibility, mobility, effectiveness and readiness of European intervention 
forces, both to improve national contributions to ACE Mobile Force and, in a crisis in 
Europe, to compensage as far as possible for any diversion outside the area of United States 
reinforcements destined for Europe; 
2. In the case of developments beyond the NATO are which the allies jointly recognise as affect-
ing their vital interests: 
(a) to facilitate by all necessary measures within the area the deployment of forces of any 
NATO country beyond the area; 
(b) in the case of those allies with appropriate military capability to participate in such 
deployments; 
3. To lend vigorous united support to the United States efforts on behalf of the alliance to secure 
satisfactory balanced and verifiable arms controls agreements with the Soviet Union in the field of 
both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces and, failing the latter by the end of 1983, to 
proceed with the deployment of GLCM and Pershing II missiles in accordance with the decision of 
12th December 1979; 
4. (a) To improve informal European defence consultation within WEU and the Eurogroup and 
arrange for the European position to be expounded clearly in the United States, especially 
to Congress committees and staffs, through a public information effort co-ordinated by the 
Washington embassies of those countries which provide the Eurogroup secretariat and 
Chairman-in-Office; 
(b) To undertake a similar effort with the assistance of the Assembly of WEU to explain to the 
European public and parliaments the contribution which the United States make to allied 
defence; 
B. Consider, and report to the Assembly on: 
1. The desirability of expanding the defence activities of the Council, last defined in 1957, to 
include European aspects of allied defence policy; 
2. The desirability of inviting all members of WEU to contribute to strengthening the European 
pillar of the western alliance. 
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Draft Resolution 
on burden-sharing in the alliance 
The Assembly, 
Reaffirming its role as the only European parliamentary assembly empowered by treaty to 
discuss defence matters; 
Stressing the need for the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance to be strengthened through 
agreement between all European allies on the basic principles of alliance defence policy and strategy; 
Recalling its Resolution 15, 
CALLS on the parliaments of Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Turkey to appoint 
observers to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to participate in the preparation 
of its forthcoming report on the state of European security; 
DECIDES that such observers shall have the right to speak. 
7 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. Under the terms of reference this report 
is to examine European and American contri-
butions to common defence in the alliance and 
the fair sharing of the burden. 
1.2. A collective security system including 
Western European Union and the Atlantic 
Alliance must be founded upon the principle of 
equitable participation in a common defence. 
Since an attack upon one member is, under the 
terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, to be 
regarded as an attack upon all the members of 
the alliance, the interdependence of the signa-
tories is not in doubt. The national defence 
provisions of the Brussels Treaty are even more 
binding and the commitment of the WEU 
nations to each other's defence lies at the heart 
ofWestem Europe's security. 
1.3. Every national contribution, whether poli-
tical, financial, military, industrial, in man-
power or materiel, contributes towards a shar-
ing of the joint burden of defence in the west-
em alliance. However, certain fundamental 
concepts should underlie the efforts that are 
made: 
(a) alliance nations must pursue an 
agreed strategy - in the case of 
NATO of forward defence and flex-
ible response underpinned by the 
availability of nuclear weapons to 
assure deterrence; 
(b) the burden of the military and econo-
mic efforts to implement this strategy 
must be distributed in a manner 
which all members of the alliance can 
accept as fair. 
1.4. Implementing these concepts is not 
easy. A free association of independent states 
has few sanctions it can realistically apply on 
those members whom the majority of the alli-
ance believe to be in default of a reasonable 
and realistically attainable contribution to their 
common defence. A too intense debate over 
the criteria to be applied to achieve a fair 
assessment of national obligations can all too 
easily prejudice political willingness to pursue 
national security objectives in an alliance 
context. 
1.5. An objective assessment, therefore, of 
burden-sharing must be very comprehensive 
and take into account as wide a range of factors 
as possible if the political susceptibilities of 
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member countries are not to be dangerously 
aroused. Such factors should include: 
(a) what outlays are required to meet 
multilaterally-recognised force goals; 
(b) the contributions of each nation both 
in input (expenditure and manpower) 
and in output (forces and equipment) 
terms; 
(c) wath a fair share of the effort required 
for every individual country actually 
is on a consensus basis; 
(d) how the burdens can be redistributed 
to match national circumstances and 
capabilities and the strategic impera-
tives recognised by the alliance as a 
whole. 
1.6. Coalition defence between wholly sove-
reign states has inherent stresses and inner ten-
sions which can only by surmounted through a 
recognition that the interests of the alliance as 
a whole transcend those of its individual mem-
bers. This is particularly so when, as in the 
case of NATO, there is great geostrategic, topo-
graphical, economic, historical and political 
diversity within it. A constant effort of poli-
tical magnanimity, imagination and goodwill is 
required to overcome those potentially fissi-
parous qualities within the alliance. 
1. 7. The NATO collective security system 
evolved in the aftermath of World War II out of 
an evident necessity to harness preponderant 
American power to redress a military imbalance 
in Europe. A relationship of virtual American 
protectorate, perhaps symbolised by the NATO 
military doctrine of the conventional force 
tripwire guaranteed by the strategy of massive 
United States nuclear retaliation which charac-
terised the 19 50s, has evolved to the point 
today where diminishing nuclear advantage at a 
strategic level and unfavourable nuclear and 
conventional balance at a theatre level call in 
question the ultimate American security gua-
rantee which Western Europeans have con-
veniently taken for granted for so long. 
1.8. At the same time, this relationship of 
strategic dependency upon the United States, 
which the European members of the alliance 
still assume, does not any longer correspond to 
the economic relationship between the United 
States and Western Europe, or to the respective 
parties' physical involvement in and economic 
dependence upon strategic developments in the 
wide areas of the world outside the area of res-
ponsibility of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nisation. The institutional and consultative 
mechanism must evolve so that the Europeans 
assert collectively their growing political autho-
rity within the alliance more effectively. 
1.9. In short, there is a temptation on the part 
of the Europeans in NATO to continue to dis-
play the military dispositions of client states 
while adopting the independent-minded poli-
tical postures commensurate with their new-
found economic power. Understandably, pub-
lic opinion in the United States, with the pers-
pective of a people with global responsibilities, 
does not understand why certain West European 
countries, where the standard of living is cer-
tainly higher than in America, should spend 
little more than half the proportion of the 
national product expended by the United 
States, much of whose military budget goes to 
defending the more affiuent Europeans. The 
argument can all too easily become simplistic 
and dangerously emotive unless it is clearly 
borne in mind that some of the deepest dis-
agreements between members of the western 
alliance have very fundamental causes. One of 
the most obvious is a difference of view about 
the military threat and hence what is militarily 
required to meet it. 
1.10. Geography, history and economic cir-
cumstances all play their part in influencing 
perceptions of the threat. Concern to preserve 
the unique relationship with fellow Germans in 
the German Democratic Republic and to 
maintain West Germany's traditional trade with 
Central Europe must influence the Federal 
Republic's perception of the threat and modify 
the Bonn Government's formulation of security 
policy in the widest sense. Likewise, the Nor-
dic balance concept of Norway and Denmark is 
evolved in response to the neutralist foreign 
policy of Sweden and Finland and not just to 
the Soviet threat to the north flank of NATO. 
1.11. Following the collapse of the European 
Defence Community in 1954 and notwithstand-
ing the political consultation within WEU; the 
Eurogroup; and the process of European poli-
tical consultation among the Ten, there are 
bound to be variations in foreign policy, threat 
analysis and diplomacy between the individual 
European members of the alliance let alone bet-
ween the West Europeans and the United Sta-
tes. Issues such as East-West relations, trade 
with the Soviet bloc, linkage with human rights 
questions, financial credits, food aid and tech-
nology transfers to Eastern Europe, arms 
control and the implementation of the Helsinki 
final act often receive markedly different treat-
ment by governments within the western 
alliance. 
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1.12. This foreign policy diversity explains 
why the greatest care must be exercised before 
reaching definitive conclusions about burden-
sharing. Not only are political assumptions 
often misleading, but a universally acceptable 
statistical basis of comparison is almost impos-
sible to attain. In the words of a NATO 
Financial and Economic Board report written 
as long ago as 19 51: 
" A final decision as to what constitutes 
an equitable distribution can never be 
derived from the mechanical use of any 
purely statistical formula. Even if the 
statistics available to the board were 
wholly comparable, no mechanical for-
mula could be devised or take account of 
the varying circumstances and peculiar 
problems of each country. Differences 
in size, population, economic structure 
and stage of development of the various 
countries make simple comparisons 
impossible. " 
1.13. Since then, to quote from the United 
States Secretary of Defence's report to the Uni-
ted States Congress on allied contributions to 
the common defence, March 1962: " despite 
many efforts and agreement that there is a need 
for burden-sharing, NATO has been unable to 
agree on an acceptable definition of the burden 
or how to measure it ". 
1.14. An objective definition of the guidelines 
for fairer burden-sharing within NATO is easier 
to achieve than a consensus among the indivi-
dual nations within the alliance as to whether 
their own contributions are equitable. Coun-
tries with low living standards or economic prob-
lems argue that a sound economy is a pre-
requisite for an effective defence. Countries with 
strong peace movements or a strong ethical 
tradition in the conduct of foreign affairs will 
stress the importance of carrying public support 
for national defence policy. Countries with a 
weak balance of payments may be reluctant to 
incur the foreign exchange costs of stationing 
forces overseas or of purchasing defence equip-
ment abroad. 
1.15. As recorded in the introductory note this 
report draws on information derived from the 
visit of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments to the United States in March 
1983 and particularly from the briefings and 
discussions at the State Department, Pentagon, 
National Security Council, on Capitol Hill and 
from industry and the United States air force. 
In Europe information was derived at SHAPE, 
NATO, CINCHAN and from national defence 
ministries. 
II. The concept of allied defence 
2.1. The Brussels Treaty of 1948 was the first 
collective security agreement after World War 
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II which was directed against the growing 
Soviet threat. Its provisions as modified by the 
Paris Protocols of 1954 form the basis of 
Western European Union and bind the signa-
tories to mutual assistance in the event of 
external attack in Europe 1• There is no 
geographic limitation to the applicability of 
the treaty for consultation purposes 2 and its 
unambiguous nature ensures that regardless of 
political developments among NATO countries 
in either Northern or Southern Europe and 
regardless of political developments in North 
America, there will be a Western European 
inner security zone among the seven nations of 
WEU. 
2.2. Although by contrast there is a stricter 
geographic limitation to the applicability of 
mutual defence under the North Atlantic 
Treaty, this should not inhibit alliance consul-
tation and co-operation in response to threats 
to the interests of member countries outside the 
NATO area. Even so, following the collapse 
of the southern and eastern tiers of Foster Dul-
les' alliance system created to contain commu-
nist expansion (CENTO and SEA TO), the 
NATO nations did very little to concert their 
security policies to protect their joint interests 
in the Middle East, Arab/Iranian Gulf, South-
West and South-East Asia and Indian Ocean. 
Indeed, the Government of the United King-
dom compounded western problems by closing 
military bases east of Suez even when in 1971 
the rulers of the Gulf sheikhdoms still wanted 
the British to stay. 
2.3. Soviet support for the Marxist regimes in 
Ethiopia and South Yemen and Vietnam at 
each extremity of the large area of instability 
along the southern edge of the Eurasian land-
mass together with the Iranian revolution and 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the heart of 
the highly volatile region bordering on the oil-
rich Arab/Iranian Gulf convinced the Govern-
ment of the United States that it must be pre-
pared militarily to fill an alarming power 
vacuum in an area of huge oil reserves and 
great strategic importance to the West. 
2.4. The United States has now created a new 
South-West Asian Command autonomous of 
SACEUR and has earmarked a rapid deploy-
ment force of up to six divisions to be assigned 
l. Article VI: "If any of the High Contracting Parties 
should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the 
other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the 
party so attacked all the military and other aid and assis-
tance in their power". 
2. Article VIII.3: " At the request of any of the High 
Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately con-
vened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any 
situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in what-
ever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic 
stability". 
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to it. Base facilities at Diego Garcia, Mashi-
rah Island and elsewhere around the littoral 
of the Indian Ocean have been built up. The 
United States navy was already overstretched in 
view of the Soviet naval challenge worldwide, 
and with the redeployment of assets from the 
Mediterranean fleet and elsewhere to the Indian 
Ocean is almost a four-fleet navy. 
2.5. The determination of the United States 
Administration not to afford to the Soviet 
Union a monopoly in underpinning the global 
competition for political influence and econo-
mic advantage by military means was heigh-
tened by the two shocks towards the end of Mr. 
Carter's presidency of Soviet invasion of Afghan-
istan and the failure of the United States 
mission to rescue the American hostages from 
the United States Embassy in Iran. 
2.6. The European members of the alliance 
may or may not agree with the new military 
role which the United States has assumed in 
South-West Asia but an urgent accommodation 
on their part with the practical consequences to 
them of growing American commitments 
beyond the NATO area is required. Open dis-
agreement with the Americans over their mili-
tary strategy in South-West Asia would deepen 
the misunderstanding that already exists within 
the alliance. Quiet emphasis on the merits of 
a grand strategy involving diplomacy, aid, poli-
tical and economic support to complement 
military preparedness and deployment would 
be a valuable contribution in terms of Euro-
pean expertise in ensuring the formulation of 
an effective alliance security policy for a noto-
riously unstable region where geography affords 
to the Soviet Union great advantages in any 
power struggle which might arise. 
2.7. Mutual defence arrangements under the 
North Atlantic Treaty are of course limited to 
the Atlantic Treaty area defined in Article 6, 
but the treaty imposes no geographical limit-
ation on consultation under Article 4 when-
ever the security of any party is threatened. 
Nevertheless, discussion of out-of-area defence 
matters has evolved only slowly in NATO, the 
most recent statement of the position being in 
the texts adopted by the sixteen members at the 
Bonn NATO summit on lOth June 1982: 
" All of us have an interest in peace and 
security in other regions of the world. 
We will consult together as appropriate 
on events in these regions which may 
have implications for our security, taking 
into account our commonly-identified 
objectives. Those of us who are in a posi-
tion to do so will endeavour to respond 
to requests for assistance from sovereign 
states whose security and independence is 
threatened. " 
The document on integrated defence adopted 
by representatives of the countries contributing 
to the integrated military structure contains the 
following paragraph : 
" Noting that developments beyond the 
NATO area may threaten our vital inte-
rests, we reaffirm the need to consult 
with a view to sharing assessments and 
identifying common objectives, taking 
full account of the effect on NATO secu-
rity and defence capability, as well as of 
the national interests of member coun-
tries. Recognising that the policies 
which nations adopt in this field are a 
matter for national decision, we agree to 
examine collectively in the appropriate 
NATO bodies the requirements which 
may arise for the defence of the NATO 
area as a result of deployments by indi-
vidual member states outside that 
area. Steps which may be taken by indi-
vidual allies in the light of such consul-
tations to facilitate possible military 
deployments beyond the NATO area can 
represent an important contribution to 
western security." 
It is considered in NATO that " developments 
beyond the NATO area " which " m~y thr~aten 
our vital interests " are only events mvolvmg a 
risk of conflict with the Soviet Union or its 
allies. 
2.8. There are two responses which the Euro-
pean members of the alliance must make in the 
event of United States out-of-area deploy-
ments. First, they have to be prepared to com-
pensate from their own resources not only for 
any United States redeployments from the 
NATO theatre to South-West Asia but also to 
make contingency plans for a si.t';lation whe~e, 
in the event of a simultaneous mthtary threat m 
Europe, United States reinforcements currently 
scheduled for rapid deployment to Europe were 
diverted instead to South-West Asia. Not-
withstanding American as~urances. that t.he 
defence of Europe will remam the htghest pno-
rity of the United States, the danger of. a 
confrontation on two fronts, and of a Sovtet 
feint or diversionary move to tie down United 
States forces in the Middle East or South-West 
Asia must be recognised. It can be met prima-
rily by the provision of some additional forces 
by the Europeans themselves, although. the 
intervention forces of some European nattons, 
notably France and the United Kingdom, are 
by no means negligible and can have a va~uable 
role to play out of the NATO area as thetr res-
pective deployments in recent years to Chad, 
Zaire, Zimbabwe and the Falkland Islands have 
shown. 
2.9. Secondly, where under the Bonn arrange-
ments quoted above NATO collectively recog-
11 
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nises that some specific " development beyond 
the NATO area " does indeed " threaten our 
vital interests " the European allies must be 
prepared to f~cilitate by action within the 
NATO area movements of United States forces, 
or indeed the forces of any other NATO coun-
try, passing through the. NATO area. ~y~r­
flying staging and refuelling and port facthtles 
of ali sorts may be involved. The United 
States on the other hand cannot expect to 
secure as it appears to be requesting, open 
ended' agreements from its European allies to 
facilitate any future United States troop move-
ments for whatever purpose they may be under-
taken. 
2.10. There is a third response which only cer-
tain European allies are in a position to offer. 
Often the early despatch of ~ very. ~ighly 
trained experienced force early m a cnsts can 
prevent its development into a full-scale emer-
gency. For this certain European airmobile or 
amphibious units, such as British marines, and 
French paratroops, would be particularly 
appropriate. Certainly an exercised and pre-
planned determination by some European 
countries to bear if only a small part of Ame-
rican out-of-area burdens would greatly 
enhance mutual understanding in the alliance. 
So would improved host-nation support, logis-
tic infrastructure, refuelling, docking and main-
tenance facilities in Europe, not just for 
United States forces assigned to NATO but also 
for United States forces en route to South-West 
Asia. 
2.11. Within the NATO area there is un-
doubtedly potential for increased role speciali-
sation but this is politically a highly sensitive 
issue since defence impinges upon national sus-
ceptibilities on sovereignty in a direct way. 
Few countries are prepared for example totally 
to assign to other nations the protec~ion of.their 
air space or the defence of thetr temtory. 
However the United Kingdom could rationally specialis~ more in naval, air and intervention 
forces but this could only be at the expense of 
its Brussels Treaty commitment on the conti-
nent in Germany which would be politically 
unwelcome to its allies. The Netherlands 
could logically concentrate its naval forces 
more in the North Sea and Channel, but that 
country understandably sets great store by its 
blue water anti-submarine role in the North 
Atlantic. The Federal Republic could at a cost 
increase still further its land and air forces in 
Central Europe although for demographic rea-
sons it would be difficult and would have 
implications for inner-German relations. .France 
in its latest defence plans has already dectded to 
modernise the whole spectrum of its nuclear 
capability and Italy with its deployments to the 
peacekeeping forces in Sin~i and Leb~~on has 
demonstrated its interventiOn capabthty and 
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concern for security within the Mediterranean 
basin as a whole. 
2.12. In short, geography, history, manpower, 
industrial and economic potential already dic-
tate a substantial degree of national speciali-
sation. Only France and the United Kingdom 
in Europe maintain independent nuclear deter-
rents. Likewise, only Britain and France main-
tain balanced forces in all three services 
together with a substantial overseas intervention 
capability. The Federal Republic of Germany 
is the dominant European nation on the central 
front. The Netherlands concentrates on the 
larger naval vessels which appertain to an ocea-
nic role at sea. The maritime role of Belgium 
is primarily coastal. In air defence there is a 
worrying tendency for Belgium to downgrade its 
air defence commitments, particularly as 
regards its contribution to modernising its sec-
tion of the Hawk SAM belt. Denmark and 
Norway have evolved the concept of total 
defence and have large home guards. Italy 
plays a key role in all three services on the 
southern flank. 
2.13. There is little prospect therefore of any 
dramatic initiative to achieve either a more 
equitable sharing of the burdens or a more cost 
effective defence by means of a rationalisation 
of national roles and responsibilities. Modest 
progress can always be achieved but bold radi-
cal changes would be politically fraught with 
danger. It has to be borne in mind that for an 
alliance committed to deterrence its cohesion 
and unity in peacetime is no less important 
than its combat capability in war. Of course it 
would be logical for the British to do more at 
sea and to concentrate more on intervention 
forces than on the central front, but with the 
German armed forces already fully stretched 
and in view of the alliance strategy of a forward 
defence reliant upon substantial in-place allied 
force contributions, there is no immediate pros-
pect of such a change in allied roles. Never-
theless for the defence of Central Europe there 
are good military and economic reasons why 
the seven WEU nations at least should better 
co-ordinate their defence policies. Franco-
German military co-operation is valuable for 
European security as is the integration of 
French air defence forces with the NATO early 
warning system. The security of the United 
Kingdom Air Defence Region and Eastern 
Atlantic and Channel Command areas are vital 
for the reinforcement of Europe. It would, 
therefore, be better if national initiatives like 
the United Kingdom defence review of 1981 
and the French defence review of 1983 were the 
subject of prior consultation within at least the 
WEU Council and preferably the Eurogroup 
Council to facilitate appropriate readjustments 
within the alliance. 
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2.14. Although the preponderance of the 
Warsaw Pact in both armour and manpower on 
the central front puts a premium on the value 
of mobility, manoeuvre and concentrating 
defence firepower at the decisive point, there is 
such a narrow defence depth available in West 
Germany that the Federal Republic's total com-
mitment to forward defence has been inevitably 
espoused by the alliance as a whole. 
2.15. SACEUR's proposals for the use of emer-
ging technology to develop new land/air tactical 
doctrines to interdict the battlefield more effec-
tively and to prevent the follow-through of 
second echelon Warsaw Pact formations are 
promising but they are no panacea. They will 
be costly and should be regarded as part of the 
evolutionary process of improving the combat 
effectiveness of NATO as and when new 
weapons systems become available. Certainly 
they should increase the confidence of western 
public opinion as these doctrines would appre-
ciably raise the nuclear threshold: But to satisfy 
Western European public opinion the procure-
ment of the new intelligent weaponry and 
precision munitions essential to enhance 
NATO's air/land capability to offset Warsaw 
Pact armoured preponderance on the central 
front must be achieved on an equitable basis, 
and it should not distort further in the United 
States' favour the alliance defence equipment 
market. 
3.1. Measuring a country's "defence effort" 
as a general concept is not a simple task; defini-
tions are needed before measurements can be 
made. It is still more difficult to compare the 
defence effort of one NATO country with that 
of another because of different national views of 
the requirements of defence resulting partly 
from social, economic and geographical diffe-
rences, and partly from different political atti-
tudes to defence. Furthermore, financial com-
parisons involving currency conversion may be 
distorted when exchange rates do not closely 
reflect purchasing power. But as least the 
NATO countries can be compared in terms of a 
market economy; comparisons between NATO 
countries and the Warsaw Pact countries with 
their centrally-directed communist economies 
are more conjectural, not only because of the 
incomplete disclosure of defence expenditure in 
the official Soviet defence budget, but also 
because of the difficulty of assigning com-
parable prices to articles in a communist 
economy. 
(b) Defence expenditure 
3.2. Defence effort is usually assessed in terms 
of defence expenditure and in terms of man-
power in the armed services - the so-called 
defence inputs. It is more difficult to assess the 
defence capacity which can be produced from 
those resources. Countries differ in the items 
which they include in their defence budgets, 
and one of the earliest tasks undertaken by the 
NATO international staff, in the framework of 
the annual review, was to draw up a common 
definition of" defence expenditure " for NATO 
purposes. This (unpublished) definition adop-
ted in 1952 is known to include government 
payments to service pension funds, and costs of 
internal security forces that would serve under 
military command in war. In general, defence 
budgets to NATO definition tend to be slightly 
higher than national defence budgets submitted 
to parliament, largely because it was easier to 
agree on a common NATO definition by includ-
ing items already included in the defence bud-
get of at least one NATO country, rather than 
by excluding items not included in the national 
definitions of a majority of countries. Still 
excluded from the NATO definition, however, 
are items which certain NATO countries would 
consider defence-related. These include actual 
payments of service pensions, war damage, civil 
defence, strategic stockpiling of industrial war 
materials, and, in the case of Germany, major 
host-country support costs, economic assistance 
to Berlin and Turkey. Figures of defence expen-
diture at Appendix I are given to NATO defini-
tion and have been published regularly in com-
mittee reports each year for more than twenty 
years. The European countries today provide 
about 38 % of total NATO defence expenditure 
compared with 24% in 1958 when the com-
mittee first published these statistics. 
3.3. It should be noted that defence effort 
measured in this way is the total defence effort 
of every NATO country, irrespective of the 
tasks to which particular elements of the armed 
forces may be assigned. Not all defence tasks 
assumed by certain NATO countries would be 
recognised by a majority of the allies as being 
" NATO-related " defence tasks. In fact no 
attempt has been made to assess defence effort 
in terms of " NATO-related " defence, partly 
because of the flexibility of defence forces 
which, for example, recently permitted the Uni-
ted Kingdom to repossess the Falkland Islands 
in an operation which most NATO countries 
would not regard as "NATO-related", whereas 
the bulk of the forces concerned normally ope-
rate within the NATO area where they are allo-
cated very much to NATO-related tasks. 
Similar examples can be cited in the case of 
military operations conducted in recent years 
by several NATO countries 
(c) Manpower contribution 
3.4. Appendix I.B. compares the present man-
power contribution of the NATO countries to 
the armed forces. The European countries col-
lectively provide 60 % of total NATO military 
manpower. As the European countries except 
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Luxembourg and the United Kingdom rely on 
conscription, whereas the United States has 
purely regular forces, there are further hidden 
defence advantages and economic costs of lost 
opportunity in the European contribution. The 
defence advantage is the large pool of trained 
reserve manpower which conscription automa-
tically leaves in the population at large after 
completion of compulsory service. This can 
be particularly impressive and important as in 
the case of the Federal Republic of Germany 
which can mobilise its Landwehr rapidly, and 
in the case of Denmark and Norway which 
have large home guards and a concept of " total 
defence". 
3.5. The hidden opportunity costs of con-
scripting manpower can be assessed in various 
ways. " If allied manpower costs for 1979 are 
computed at United States pay rates, the value 
of non-United States NATO total defence 
would increase relatively to the United States 
by approximately 20 % reaching a total 
approximately equal to that of the United Sta-
tes. As a result, several countries such as 
Canada, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, 
whose average pay and allowances are higher 
than in the United States, would have their 
defence expenditures adjusted downwards; 
others, notably Turkey, Italy, Portugal and 
France, would see theirs increased. " 1 
(d) Ability to contribute and comparison between 
NATO countries 
3.6. Defence expenditure statistics published 
by NATO (Appendix I) include some measures 
of ability to contribute - gross domestic pro-
duct; population; and gross domestic product 
per capita - and derive from these comparative 
statistics of national contributions to allied 
defence. The most widely quoted are defence 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and armed 
forces as a percentage of the active population 
because international comparison between these 
figures is not distorted by conversion of natio-
nal currencies. Defence expenditure itself, and 
defence expenditure per capita can only be 
compared when converted to a single currency 
with the reservations noted above. 
3.7. There are, however, limitations in mea-
suring defence expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP. Not all countries can be expected to 
devote the same percentage of their domestic 
product to defence - countries with the lowest 
per capita domestic product will be expected to 
make a prior claim on it to provide basic living 
standards for the population before making any 
significant contribution to allied defence 
1. United States Secretary of Defence report to Congress 
on allied contributions to the common defence, March 
1982. 
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beyond a local domestic defence effort. The 
"wealthier" countries in terms of GDP per 
capita can be expected to have a larger "avail-
able " GDP after basic living standards have 
been met, part of which can then reasonably be 
devoted to allied defence. The graph at 
Appendix II, therefore, shows defence expendi-
ture as a percentage of GDP plotted against 
GDP per capita. Surprisingly, this graph 
shows a very significant defence effort on the 
part of the three poorest countries of the 
alliance- Turkey, Portugal and Greece- and a 
below average defence effort among some of the 
wealthier countries - Norway, Canada, Den-
mark and Luxembourg. 
3.8. The comparative prosperity of countries 
as measured by GDP per capita, converted to 
dollars at current exchange rates, shows a rela-
tive decline in the position of the United States 
compared with the other allies over the last 
decade. At $11 ,348 per head for 1980, the 
United States came only seventh amorig NATO 
countries, among which Norway led with 
$13,766. This perception of ability to contri-
bute has bedevilled the transatlantic argument 
on burden-sharing which is discussed in the fol-
lowing section. It has, however, been pointed 
out that the exchange rates used in this calcula-
tion, and inflation rates assumed for constant 
price comparisons over a period of years, do 
not accurately reflect the purchasing power of 
national currencies. When conversions are 
carried out using purchasing power parity 
instead of fluctuating exchange rates, the 
United States remains a significantly wealthier 
country measured by GDP per capita ($11 ,348 
in 1980) than any other member of the alliance. 
Luxembourg, the second in this table, had only 
$9,430 1• 
3.9. Since March 1981, in response to the 
amendment introduced by Senator Levin to the 
fiscal year 1981 Defence Authorisation Act, the 
Secretary of Defence has submitted an annual 
report to Congress on allied commitments to 
defence spending ( 1981) and allied contribu-
tions to the common defence (1982). This 
report goes into burden-sharing in considerable 
statistical detail. In particular it has inves-
tigated other possible measures of ability to 
contribute than those mentioned above. The 
most original feature is a " prosperity index " 
which is derived for each country first by multi-
plying that country's percentage share of the 
total allied GDP by its per capita GDP expres-
sed as a percentage of the highest per capita 
GDP of any NATO country (Denmark). The 
resultant product is totalled for all NATO 
countries and an individual country " prospe-
rity index" is expressed as its percentage share 
of the allied total (" allied " is taken in the 
Secretary of Defence's report as the total for 
NATO plus Japan). Other indicators of ability 
l. Sharing the defence burden, Rainer W. Rupp, Econo-
mic Directorate of the NATO International Staff in NATO 
Review, December 1982. 
NATO countries' gross domestic product per head 
in 1980, in US$ 
Based on exchange rates Based on purchasing power parity 
Country Index Index 
US$ NATO= Rank US$ NATO= Rank 
100.0 100.0 
(0) (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Germany 13,306 137.1 1 9,411 106.3 3 
Denmark 12,957 133.5 2 9,094 102.7 4 
France 12,136 125.0 3 9,046 102.2 5 
Belgium 12,084 124.5 4 8,924 100.8 6 
Luxembourg 12,059 124.2 5 9,430 106.5 2 
Netherlands 11,851 122.1 6 8,599 97.1 7 
United States 11,348 116.9 7 11,348 128.2 1 
United Kingdom 9,344 96.3 8 7,622 86.1 8 
Italy 6,906 71.1 9 7,205 81.4 9 
Spain 5,648 58.2 10 5,843 66.0 10 
Greece 4,236 43.6 11 4,713 53.2 11 
Portugal 2,423 25.0 12 3,675 41.5 12 
Other NATO 
countries (•) 5,082 52.3 X 5,508 62.2 X 
TOTAL NATO 9,708 100.0 X 8,852 100.0 X 
(•) Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey. 
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to contribute contained in the report are : per-
centage share of total allied GOP; percentage 
share of total allied population; per capita GOP 
as a percent of the highest nation. 
3.10. The same report lists seven selected indi-
cators of defence contribution : defence spend-
ing as a share of total allied expenditure; 
defence spending as a percentage increase since 
1971; percentage share of total allied defence 
manpower; percentage increase in defence man-
power since 1971; total active and reserve 
defence manpower share of the allied total; 
ground forces as a percentage share of total 
allied ground forces (expressed in armoured 
division equivalents); and tactical combat air-
craft as a percentage share of the allied total. 
Selected indicators from this report, comparing 
contribution with ability to contribute, are 
reproduced at Appendix Ill. 
(e) Trends of defence expenditure 
3.11. Figures for defence expenditure for a 
single year are less informative than the trend 
of defence expenditure over a number of years, 
partly because with some countries expenditure 
in a single year may be distorted through the 
costs of some equipment procurement pro-
gramme falling particularly heavily in one 
year. Also in 1977 NATO defence ministers 
agreed to increase defence spending " in the 
region of 3 % per annum in real terms " over 
the planning period 1979 to 1984, reaffirmed in 
1980 for the period up to 1986. The extent to 
which countries have fulfilled this commitment 
can be seen from the table of annual defence 
expenditure, if expressed in constant prices (to 
allow for inflation). NATO, however, has not 
yet been able to reach agreement on the defla-
tors to be applied to defence expenditure in the 
different countries in order to produce a fair 
statement of expenditure at constant prices. 
As a consequence of this, the official NATO 
defence expenditure statistics published each 
December do not include a series of country 
expenditures at constant prices. Curiously, 
however, for the last few years these statistics 
have included figures of defence expenditure 
per capita for six successive years expressed at 
constant prices. These can only have been 
produced through the use of some provisional 
deflator by the NATO staff, and by multiplying 
by the populations concerned it is possible to 
deduce from these figures a table of total 
defence expenditure at constant prices. This 
is shown at Appendix IV. Annual percentage 
increases in real terms actually achieved by 
member countries from 1978 to 1982 have 
fluctuated widely between one year and 
another, and between different countries, 
Greece showing a decrease of 8.8% between 
1979 and 1980, while Luxembourg recorded the 
largest increase of 16.3 % from 1979 to 1980. 
15 
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(j) NATO-Warsaw Pact comparisons 
3.12. It is instructive to extend the foregoing 
methodology for international comparison of 
defence inputs to a comparison of the defence 
efforts of the NATO and Warsaw Pact coun-
tries. Most publicity is attracted to East-West 
comparisons of defence output - assessments of 
the defence capability the inputs produce. As 
pointed out in paragraph 3.1, however, to make 
input comparisons an attempt has to be made 
to assign values to the Soviet defence effort in 
terms of western market economies. It is of 
course widely accepted that the officially 
published Soviet defence budget records only 
part of defence expenditure, and is known to 
exclude the large amount spent on research and 
development. 
3.13. For the past fourteen years, the United 
States Government has published annually esti-
mates of Soviet and Warsaw Pact defence 
expenditure in the ACDA series "World Mili-
tary Expenditures and Arms Transfers". Figu-
res for defence expenditure in dollars given in 
this publication are calculated by the CIA on 
the " building block " method whereby separate 
estimates are made of the value of research and 
development (nearly a quarter of the total); 
procurement of equipment and construction 
(about one-half); and operating costs (a little 
over one-quarter, of which 60 % is personnel 
costs). These official United States estimates 
for NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the United States 
and the Soviet Union are shown at Appendix 
V. The March 1981 version of World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers, quoting 
constant 1977 prices, shows NATO as a whole 
to have outspent the Warsaw Pact in defence 
spending in every year from 1970 to 1978 - the 
last covered in the publication. The March 
1982 version, however, using constant 1978 
prices, shows total Warsaw Pact expenditure 
slightly exceeding that of NATO for the years 
1976 to 1978 inclusive, while NATO again 
overtook the Warsaw Pact in 1979. What, of 
course, is more disturbing for the United States 
authorities was the trend of Soviet defence 
expenditure in these calculations which from 
being less than that of the United States up to 
1970, significantly overtook it in the years 1971 
to 1979 - the last quoted in the 1982 edition. 
Press reports on 7th April of the 1983 edition 
referred to an estimate for Soviet expenditure of 
$188 billion in 1980 compared with United 
States expenditure of $131 billion. However, 
the press one month earlier 1 reported that the 
CIA estimates on which the WMEA T figures 
were based had been revised for the year 1981 
to show Soviet expenditure of $160 billion 
compared with United States $154 billion. 
l. International Herald Tribune, Guardian, 4th March 
1983. 
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The basis of the reduction was CIA intelligence 
analysis that the Soviet Union had produced 
less military equipment than predicted, leading 
the CIA to revise downwards its estimate of 
annual increase in Soviet defence expenditure 
from 3 or 4 % to 2 %. Accepted by the State 
Department, the CIA findings had been dispu-
ted by the United States Defence Intelligence 
Agency which had suggested that original esti-
mates of expenditure were correct, but that 
higher costs had led to less equipment being 
produced. 
3.14. Independent academic comparisons of 
Soviet and United States, and of Warsaw Pact 
and NATO expenditure claim that the CIA 
dollar estimates of the components of the Soviet 
defence effort, particularly the research and 
development and manpower costs, are over-
stated. The following bar chart shows two offi-
cial and three independent academic compari-
sons for 1978 which show an excess of NATO 
over Warsaw Pact expenditure ranging from 
about 40% to 5 % (excluding of course the 
Warsaw Pact estimate). 
CHART 22 
Military Expenditures of the Major 
Alliances, 1978 - Five VIews 
billion dollars 
[1 Other Warsaw Pact Other NATO 
• Soviet Union • United States 
-150 
-100 
-so 
~~~~--~~--~~.u--0 Official Official 
Warsaw U.S. 
Pact Gov1. 
1 2 
IISS 
3 
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I. Defence budgets and official rates of exchange, as 
reported to UN. 
2. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World 
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969-78. 
3. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Mili-
tary Balance, 1979-80, (IISS has since discontinued publi-
cation of an estimate for USSR). 
4. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
SIPRI Yearbook 1981. 
5. This publication, Table II. 
Source: World Military and Social Expenditures 
1981. Ruth Leger Sivard. Publisher World Priorities Inc. 
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3.15. Estimates of numbers in the armed forces 
are not subject to the uncertainties involved in 
cost comparisons between the unlike economies 
of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. The 
United States ACDA WMEA T reports referred 
to above show total NATO armed forces for 
1979 (the latest year available in that publi-
cation) of 5.29 million compared with 6.16 mil-
lion for the Warsaw Pact. The IISS Military 
Balance estimate for that year is 4.88 million 
for NATO compared with 4.76 million for the 
Warsaw Pact; the difference is unexplained. 
The latest IISS estimates for 1982 are NATO 
5.35 million; Warsaw Pact 4.82 million. 
IV. The transatlantic debate 
4.1. The burden-sharing debate at the present 
time has arisen largely through United States, 
especially Congressional, perceptions of sup-
posed shortcomings on the part of the European 
allies. These include inadequate European 
contributions to what the United States believes 
the allied defence effort should be, or failure of 
the European allies to follow United States 
policy in economic and political relations with 
the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. 
Typical of some attitudes in Congress, seeking 
reductions in public spending yet believing that 
United States superiority in naval and air 
power was its chief guarantee of protection 
from the Soviet Union, was the enactment by 
the Senate last autumn requiring the level of 
United States troops stationed ashore in Europe 
by the end of fiscal year 1983 (30th September) 
not to exceed their real levels at September 
1982 (315,600). The move led by Senator Ste-
vens, Chairman of the Defence Subcommittee 
of the Senate Appropriations Committee, had 
originally sought a freeze at the lower level of 
March 1980. 
4.2. The United States Administration itself 
has to face both ways - at times assuring 
Congress that the European· allies make a large 
proportionate contribution to the total allied 
defence effort, at others exhorting the Euro-
peans to make a bigger effort, or to align them-
selves more closely with United States policy 
towards the Soviet Union. 
4.3. Typical of the first is evidence given by 
Mr. Eagleburger, Under-Secretary of State, to 
the Senate Armed Services Committee on 26th 
March 1982 on " the critical importance of 
maintaining the United States military presence 
in Europe". Noting that over the thirty years 
since the creation of NATO "the United 
States-Soviet balance has moved from United 
States superiority to, at best, a precarious 
balance, with powerful adverse trends", he 
asserted that " we are now running hard to 
make up for nearly a generation of neglect in 
our military programmes. The allies in 
contrast, have turned in a remarkably steady 
performance. Roughly speaking they have sus-
tained an increase of between 2 and 3 % for 
more than a decade. " 
4.4. The Secretary of Defence's annual 
reports to Congress referred to above 1, submit-
ted in accordance with the Levin amendment to 
the 1981 Defence Authorisation Act, provide a 
systematic, objective, and on the whole opti-
mistic assessment of the European contribu-
tion. In the words of the 1981 report : 
"There is no question that the United 
States and its allies can provide the forces 
necessary to meet the Soviet threat and to 
execute agreed NATO strategy. Collec-
tively we have more than adequate 
resources - human, industrial, technolo-
gical and financial - to provide a reason-
able margin of security ... 
The NATO allies maintain on active 
duty about three million men and women 
compared with about two million for the 
United States and 250,000 for Japan. If 
we include reserves... the allied total is 
over six million compared with about 
three million for the United States. If 
we add civilian defence manpower ... the 
totals come to just under eight million for 
the allies and just over four million for 
the United States. The GOP of all the 
non-United States NATO nations combi-
ned represents around 45 % of the NATO 
and Japan total. Our NATO allies 
account for over 60 % of total NATO 
and Japan ground combat capability, 
around 55 % of the tactical air force com-
bat aircraft and around 50 % of the total 
tonnage of naval surface combatants and 
sumbarines. " 
4.5. "... We have devised for the purposes 
of this report a number of indices of 
burden-sharing and have developed an 
overall assessment. We believe this 
approach - while imperfect and certainly 
not agreed by the allies - can give a 
better perspective of burden-sharing than 
any one individual indicator. Using this 
formulation, the aggregated NATO allies 
appear to be shouldering their fair share 
of the total NATO and Japan defence 
burden." 
4.6. The 1982 report follows similar lines, 
pointing out that " collectively [the NA.TO 
allies and Japan] have 80 % greater population, 
four times the GOP and more than double the 
per capita GOP of the Warsaw Pact". Curi-
1. On allied commitments to defence spending, March 
1981; and on allied contributions to the common defence, 
March 1982. 
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ously it then reduces significantly the assess-
ment of allied contribution : " Our NATO 
allies account for over 55 % of total NATO and 
Japanese ground combat capability, around 
50 % of the tactical air force combat aircraft 
and around 35 % of the total tonnage of naval 
surface combatants ... ". The reductions of 
these percentages from 60 %, 55 %, and 50% 
respectively the previous year are obviously far 
greater than any real changes in the force bal-
ance in the intervening twelve months. In 
conclusion the report is more critical of its 
allies: " In the final analysis the United States 
appears to be doing somewhat more than its 
fair share of the NATO and Japanese total 
based on quantifiable measures examined for 
this report. " 
4. 7. The informal meeting of defence minis-
ters of all European NATO countries, except 
France but now including Spain, known as 
Eurogroup regularly publishes its assessment of 
the European contribution to defence within 
the alliance. The last communique of 29th 
November 1982 noted a more favourable Euro-
pean share than did the foregoing reports : 
"4. Within the NATO partnership, Euro-
group countries participating in NATO's 
integrated military structure make a sub-
stantial and significant contribution to 
the alliance's military forces. Their act-
ive armed forces total some two-and-a-
half million and they provide approxima-
tely 75% of NATO's readily available 
ground forces in Europe, 7 5 % of the 
tanks, 65 % of the air forces and 60 % of 
the warships ... " 
A list of new military equipment being intro-
duced by the Eurogroup countries was append-
ed. The percentages would of course be 
increased if account were taken of French 
forces. 
4.8. In the light of the foregoing authoritative 
assessments, and the Rapporteur's extensive dis-
cussions in NATO, SHAPE, and Bonn, the 
committee concludes that on the whole the 
European countries are providing a very rea-
sonable share of the allied defence burden. 
Required improvements in the European effort 
call for a long-term commitment to steady 
enhancement, particularly in " sustainability" 
of the conventional forces - the ability to offer 
sustained resistance beyond the first few days of 
any possible attack. This requires an improve-
ment in the ammunition stockpiles of many 
countries and in rapidly available reserves to 
relieve the combat fatigue of forward troops, 
although there is more insistence in some 
quarters on the need to be able to " re-establish 
deterrence " if the forward defences were in 
danger of being overrun. Certainly a 4 % 
increase in real terms in defence budgets called 
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for by SACEUR to provide new generations of 
conventional equipment and weapons to permit 
detailed reconnaissance, target acquisition and 
selective attack on the second echelon of Soviet 
forces will not be forthcoming; the need is 
rather for steady investment in new weapons 
technology as proven weapon systems become 
available. Mr. Weinberger's emerging techno-
logy on which he has reported to NATO can be 
incorporated only progressively into the NATO 
armoury. 
4.9. With the present United States Admin-
istration there have been significant failures of 
allied consultation. President Reagan's address 
to the National Association of Evangelicals on 
8th March 1983- dubbed the" Darth Vaders" 
speech by the Washington establishment -
portraying the Soviet Union as an implacably 
hostile power reveals an outlook not shared by 
European, governments. His proposal for 
research on new ABM systems in his television 
address of 23rd March - dubbed the "Star 
Wars" speech - was not conveyed by 
Mr. Weinberger attending the Nuclear Plan-
ning Group of NATO defence ministers in 
Portugal a few hours earlier the same day. 
Mr. Weinberger was either himself unaware 
that the proposal would be made, or still 
hoping that President Reagan would heed the 
advice of Department of Defence advisers not 
to make the proposal. It is a lesser failure of 
communication that the otherwise valuable 
briefings given to the committee in the Pen-
tagon only a few hours before the Presidential 
speech should have contained no inkling of the 
ABM proposal. 
4.10. Differences between the present United 
States Administration and European govern-
ments in general policy issues related to defence 
are frankly recognised in the Secretary of State's 
1982 report on allied contributions to the com-
mon defence already quoted in the burden-
sharing context above: 
"Emphasising social and economic viabi-
lity as their first priority, many Euro-
peans continue to view the Soviet threat 
less seriously than the United States. 
Moreover, United States and European 
views of how best to counter the Soviet 
threat remain divergent, in spite of major 
United States efforts over the past year to 
portray the threat graphically for Euro-
pean elites and publics... Europeans 
believe Soviet policy can be moderated 
through traditional forms of social, eco-
nomic and political contact. They are 
less enthusiastic than the United States 
about the build-up of military force as a 
counter to the Soviet challenge. " 
Referring to foregone economic benefits of 
defence contributions, the report continues: 
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" Occasionally however the common 
interest is overridden. An especially 
painful example occurred during 1981 
and early 1982 when several allies opted 
in favour of economic expediency rather 
than defence interests in agreeing to the 
West Siberian pipeline despite strong 
opposition by the United States. In this 
case some NATO countries chose to 
place the interests of their domestic 
industry ahead of national security consi-
derations. This occurred even though it 
was far from clear that the cost of deli-
vered natural gas would be economical, 
given the hidden charges in the long-
term bargain struck with the Soviet 
Union. In addition, despite the projec-. 
ted massive dependency on Soviet gas of 
western areas such as Bavaria, no safe-
guards have been planned by the allies to 
offset the danger of a gas cut-off. This 
is a very critical development in the 
alliance and it may have serious conse-
quences in the future. " 
4.11. The tendency of the present United 
States Administration to assume that its 
approach to East-West relations is the correct 
one for the alliance as a whole has led to an . 
increase in consultation on defence and security 
issues among the European countries indepen-
dently of the United States, and for calls for 
further improvement in such arrangements -
discussed in the next chapter. 
V. The European pillar 
(a) General 
5.1. There is a growing feeling today among 
European members of NATO, reflected strongly 
gly among members of the committee, that the 
European members of the alliance must concert 
their views on the main principles of allied 
defence policy and strategy as they affect Euro-
peans. The European pillar of the alliance 
must be strengthened. That observation has 
been made many times before. The question 
on which there is less agreement is on what 
topics and to what extent should the Europeans 
consult independently, and in what institutional 
framework? Several are available and are 
considered separately below. 
(b) Western European Union 
5.2. Western European Union is primarily a 
defence organisation as Article V of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty makes clear. After signa-
ture of the treaty by the original five members 
in 1948, the Brussels Treaty Organisation, as 
WEU was then known, created its own Western 
Union Defence Organisation and established 
the first post-war allied headquarters at Fon-
tainebleau. But even in the eyes of the five 
signatories WUDO was a stop-gap, awaiting the 
signature of the North Atlantic Treaty which 
took place the following year. Once the 
NATO integrated military structure was in 
place the BTO dissolved its own defence orga-
nisation as superfluous and transferred its exis-
ting military headquarters and infrastructure 
programme to NATO. The relevant resolution 
of the Council of 20th September 19 50 is worth 
quoting: 
"Resolution. by the Consultative Council 
of the Brussels Treaty Organisation of 
20th December 1950 on the future 
of the organisation 
of western defence 
in the light of the creation 
ofthe North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
military structure 1• 
1. The Consultative Council have consi-
dered the suggestion of the North 
Atlantic Council that the Brussels Treaty 
powers should review the status of the 
Western Union Defence Organisation in 
the light of the establishment of an 
overall North Atlantic Treaty Command 
Organisation. 
2. The Consultative Council have 
noted: 
(i) that it has been decided to 
dissolve the existing European 
Regional Planning Groups with 
their Regional Chiefs-of-Staff and 
principal Staff Officers Commit-
tees; 
(ii) the view of the North Atlantic 
Council that, when the new 
NATO Command Organisation 
is established, it will be unneces-
sary and undesirable to have a 
parallel Western Union Com-
mand and that the new Head-
quarters suggested for Western 
Europe should be directly under 
SHAPE and should not be res-
ponsible to the Western Union 
Defence Committee. 
3. The Council agree that, in the light 
of this re-organisation, the continued 
existence of the Western Union Defence 
Organisation in its present form is no 
longer necessary. They accordingly 
instruct the Permanent Commission to 
consider in consultation with the Western 
Union Military Committee, acting on the 
instructions of the Defence Ministers. 
l. Reproduced previously in Document 29, Jrd October 
1956, and Document 557, 16th November 1971. 
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how the proposed re-organisation can 
best be effected and what military machi-
nery, if any, needs to be retained under 
the Brussels Treaty. 
4. The Council affirm that these new 
arrangements will in no way affect the 
obligations assumed towards each other 
by the signatory powers under the Brus-
sels Treaty. In particular, the Consult-
ative Council established under Arti-
cle VII, including the non-military 
organs set up under the Council, will 
continue to function, and the reorganisa-
tion of the military machinery shall not 
affect the right of the Western Union 
Defence Ministers and Chiefs-of-Staff to 
meet as they please to consider matters of 
mutual concern to the Brussels Treaty 
powers." 
It will be noted in particular that under para-
graph 4 of the resolution the new arrangements 
"shall not affect the right of the Western Union 
defence ministers and chiefs-of-staff to meet as 
they please to consider matters of mutual 
concern to the Brussels Treaty powers". 
5.3. However, since that date defence min-
isters and chiefs-of-staff have not met in the 
Brussels Treaty framework, and when the treaty 
was modified in 19 54 to create the seven 
member WEU the 1950 resolution was in effect 
confirmed in the new Article IV of the modi-
fied treaty which expressly provides that NATO 
military bodies will not be duplicated : 
" In the execution of the treaty, the high 
contracting parties and any organs estab-
lished by them under the treaty shall 
work in close co-operation with the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
Recognising the undesirability of dupli-
cating the military staffs of NATO, the 
Council and its Agency will rely on the 
appropriate military authorities of NATO 
for information and advice on military 
matters." 
In fact, under the terms of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty the military provisions concerning 
levels of forces and control of armaments incor-
porated in Protocols Nos. II, III and IV, are 
inextricably linked to the integrated military 
structure of NATO which is made responsible 
in part for implementation of some of the WEU 
treaty obligations. 
5.4. While the Council recognises that its 
defence responsibilities - notably under Art-
icles V and VIII of the treaty - are not dimi-
nished by post-1950 arrangements, the desirable 
extent of the Council's defence activities has 
been the subject of debate between the Council 
and the Assembly ever since the latter was estab-
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lished under the same 19 54 modifications. 
As a consequence of this debate the Council 
was led in 1957 to define formally the scope of 
its residual defence and related activities. The 
seven governments considered that the activities 
of the Council in the field of defence questions 
and armaments should relate only to : 
" (a) matters which the contracting par-
ties wish to raise, especially under 
Article VIII; 
(b) the level of forces of member states; 
(c) the maintenance of certain United 
Kingdom forces on the continent; 
(d) the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments; 
(e) the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee." 1 
Since then it is understood that no government 
has in fact raised any matter under Article VIII 
of the treaty, so that Council defence activities 
have been limited to discussion of force level 
limitations, arms control and Standing Arma-
ments Committee matters discussed in another 
report by the committee 1• As the committee 
points out in that report, on the basis of exten-
sive quotations from ministers of member coun-
tries who have addressed the Assembly, 
although member governments today are unani-
mous in stressing the importance of the Assem-
bly's functions as a contribution to public 
debate on defence issues, no WEU government 
has proposed that the defence activities of the 
WEU Council should be increased; indeed, 
Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations 
of France, reporting to the French National 
Assembly on 6th June 1982 on his earlier 
address to the WEU Assembly, commented 
specifically on the lack of any great future for 
the executive of WEU : 
"The other day, on behalf of the French 
Government, I addressed the Assembly of 
WEU, not because the executive of WEU 
seems to have a very great future but 
because the Assembly is an elected one ... 
competent to handle these [defence] mat-
ters, which must be discussed among 
members of parliament... " 
5.5. The fact that despite intermittent urging 
by the Assembly over the last twenty-five years 
the Council since 19 50 has chosen not to dis-
cuss allied defence planning, is not in itself a 
reason why it should not do so at the present 
time. Several members of the committee 
believe that without seeking to replace the 
l. Second annual report of the Council, Document 37, 
25th February 1957. 
l. Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the 
twenty-eighth annual report of the Council, Document 94!t 
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organs of NATO concerned with detailed allied 
defence planning, and taking full account of 
member states, obligations to NATO, the 
Council of WEU should today assume respon-
sibility for discussing the main lines of a 
defence strategy common to the WEU coun-
tries. The advantages of reviving Brussels 
Treaty defence activities in this way are 
obvious : the seven member countries collect-
ively provide the great bulk of the European 
defence contribution to NATO; their forces 
man the vital central front; they include all the 
most important defence production industries 
in Europe; they include all the countries on 
whose territory it is proposed to deploy a new 
generation of intermediate-range nuclear mis-
siles if the INF talks fail. Most important, 
France, which has withdrawn its forces from 
the integrated military structure of NATO, 
remains a full member of WEU as does the 
only other European nuclear power, the United 
Kingdom. 
5.6. There is, however, a serious political 
disadvantage in discussing collective defence 
policy among only an inner nucleus of Euro-
pean allies. Your Rapporteur was made very 
much aware of it during his extensive discus-
sions in preparing the present report, and it has 
obviously inhibited member governements in 
making any such use of WEU since 
1950. Any proposal for a "causus" meeting 
of European countries within NATO is a 
delicate matter because of the obvious exclusion 
of the United States and Canada from such 
discussions. Any inner caucus meeting of 
seven countries within the fourteen European 
allies will be particularly resented by the 
remaining seven just as much as suggestions for 
defence meetings of a " big three " or " big 
four " - put forward occasionally in the past 
have been bitterly resented by other members 
of WEU. As it happens the peripheral Euro-
pean members of NATO, although the defence 
efforts of some of them may appear smaller 
than the average contribution of European 
countries, all make a vital contribution to allied 
defence through the strategic location of their 
mainland and island territories which almost 
completely block sea and air access of Soviet 
forces to the open oceans, or provide important 
naval bases, maritime patrol bases and sub-
marine listening posts. Norway and Turkey 
alone among NATO countries have common 
frontiers with the Soviet Union itself. 
5.7. For the foregoing reasons many members 
of the committee feel that in any attempt to 
agree on a European approach to the main 
principles of allied defence strategy it is essen-
tial to ensure the participation of all European 
members of NATO. On a number of occa-
sions in the past the Assembly has recommen-
ded that other European NATO countries 
should be invited to join WEU 1; the Council 
has never agreed to extend such invitations 
knowing that they would not be taken up as 
was once made clear by one of the countries 
concerned 2• The political obstacles to acces-
sion to the modified Brussels Treaty by other 
European allies are several: first the treaty 
embodies many outdated restrictions on force 
ceilings and internal arms control; secondly 
accession at the present late stage could be seen 
as a vote of no-confidence in NATO and in the 
United States commitment which is particularly 
important to the countries of the periphery. 
Lastly, some European allies may not wish to 
subscribe to the terms of the mutual defence 
obligations in Article V of the Brussels Treaty 
which are more constraining than the corres-
ponding Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
5.8. For all these reasons the draft recommen-
dation proposes in paragraph B.1 that the 
Council should consider and report to the 
Assembly on the desirability of expanding its 
defence activities. The defence activities of the 
WEU Assembly remain uncontroversial. The 
draft resolution included in this report recalls 
the earlier Resolution 15 of the Assembly 
adopted on 18th June 1959, on a report from 
the Presidential Committee 1 whereby the 
Assembly considered the interests " of member 
states of NATO which are not members of 
WEU " and decided that the committee could 
invite observers from any NATO country to 
attend its meeting with the right to speak. In 
implementation of that resolution, the commit-
tee did in fact invite parliamentary observers 
from Denmark and Norway, some of whom 
duly attended meetings at that time, but the 
practice appears to have fallen into abeyance. 
The draft resolution now proposed would 
specifically invite parliamentary observers from 
all European NATO countries not members of 
WEU to participate with the right to speak in 
meetings of the committee which will be 
concerned with the preparation of the forth-
coming report on the state of European 
security. In paragraph 4 (b) of the draft recom-
mendation the committee also proposes that the 
Assembly should assist governments in explai-
ning to the European public and parliaments 
the contribution which the United States makes 
to allied defence. 
(c) Eurogroup 
5.9. Eurogroup describes itself as "an infor-
mal association of defence ministers of Euro-
pean member governments within the frame-
l. Recommendation 41 of 3rd December 1959; Recom-
mendation 372 of 1st December 1981. 
2. Reply of the Council to Recommendation 41. 
1. Text at Appendix IX. 
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work of NATO ... " open to all European mem-
bers of the alliance. It was founded in 1968 at 
the suggestion of Mr. Denis Healey (the then 
United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence) 
" as a means of responding to a widespread 
desire for closer European co-operation within 
the alliance " 1• In particular, the Eurogroup 
" provides an informal forum for an exchange 
of views by defence ministers on major poli-
tical/strategic questions affecting the common 
defence". 
5.10. Originally an informal dinner of defence 
ministers in 1968, discussion among partici-
pants today continues between the Permanent 
Representatives to NATO of the participating 
countries and their staffs. Participation in 
Eurogroup has extended progressively and now 
includes all European members of NATO with 
the exception of France. Significantly Spain, 
which does not yet participate in the integrated 
military structure of NATO, took part in 
the ministerial Eurogroup meeting on 29th -
November 1982. Eurogroup has no interna-
tional staff, or formal structure. Secretarial 
services are provided by the staffs of the various 
participating delegations. Meetings are held in 
the NATO headquarters. Eurogroup also aims 
at co-ordinating more closely the defence efforts 
of participating countries and for this purpose 
has established some nine subgroups which 
have had varying degrees of success. 
5.11. It is as an informal forum for discussion 
of political and strategic questions affecting 
common defence that Eurogroup activity 
appears to have increased during the last two 
years, as the European NATO countries have 
increasingly felt the need to co-ordinate the 
European attitude to the United States within 
NATO. Such " caucussing " within the 
NATO framework is of course a politically sen-
sitive matter, but Eurogroup provides a flexible 
and discreet framework because meetings bet-
ween officials within the NATO headquarters 
need not attract publicity. 
5.12. France does not participate in the Euro-
group; the then French Minister of Defence, 
Mr. Debre, took some weeks to consider the 
invitation to attend the first Eurogroup dinner 
of defence ministers in 1968. One factor at 
that time was that the British initiative was 
suspected of being a " back door " to British 
membership of the European Community then 
being negotiated. The other factor undoub-
tedly was the link with NATO. 
5.13. The first of these obstacles to French par-
ticipation in Eurogroup disappeared in 1973 
with British accession to the European Commu-
nity. As for the second, it can be said that 
l. Quotations from " The Eurogroup " pamphlet pub-
lished by Eurogroup. issued by NATO information service. 
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Eurogroup as such has no closer links to 
NATO than France which, despite the 1966 
withdrawal from the integrated military struc-
ture, has always remained a fuller part~cipant in 
NATO as a whole than is generally recognised. 
France, of course, is a full participant in the 
North Atlantic Council, as it is now in such 
NATO bodies as the new Air Defence Commit-
tee, in the Conference of National Armaments 
Directors, as well as in the three NATO mili-
tary agencies based in France. Some French 
nationals remain in the NATO International 
Staff, chiefly in the economic and political sec-
tions; French military missions are of course 
appointed to the NATO Military Committee 
and to all military headquarters. On balance it 
would seem that the political obstacles in the 
way of French participation in Eurogroup are 
fewer than those in the way of the accession of 
six or seven European NATO countries to 
WEU. It was noted at the time of the NATO 
summit meeting in Bonn in June 1982 that the 
attendance of President Mitterrand at the 
concluding formal dinner was a precedent. It 
could not be a greater precedent for a French 
Defence Minister to attend the next Eurogroup 
dinner of defence ministers - it is understood 
that an invitation was extended on one recent 
occasion. 
5.14. The committee suggests in paragraph B.2 
of the draft recommendation that the Council 
consider and report to the Assembly on the 
desirability of inviting all members of WEU to 
contribute to strengthening the European pillar 
of the western alliance. Many members 
believe that Eurogroup, where all European 
members of NATO except France are already 
present, remains the most flexible and appro-
priate method of concerting European positions 
on NATO-related defence issues, without 
having a disruptive effect on allied defence 
planning. There is a case for strengthening the 
ability of Eurogroup to make its position better 
known in the United States, particularly to 
members of Congress. This can be co-ordi-
nated through the United Kingdom Embassy in 
Washington, as that country provides the 
permanent secretariat to Eurogroup, and addi-
tionally througq the Washington Embassy of 
the country which for the time being is 
chairman-in-office of the Eurogroup as happe-
ned during a recent tour by Eurogroup officials 
and senior officers to the United States as a 
public relations exercise. 
(d) European political co-operation 
5.15. European political co-operation among 
the ten countries of the Community has been 
increasingly successful on a number of issues 
including Middle East policy. It is now agreed 
among the ten foreign ministers that " secu-
rity " policy can be discussed in that frame-
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work. The Falklands is a recent example of 
very rapid decision-making by the Ten in this 
framework in a resolution condemning the 
Argentine invasion. Other " security " matters 
discussed by the Ten include the European 
position in the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe and aspects of disarma-
ment usually considered in the United Nations 
framework. 
5.16. European political co-operation is a 
largely informal arrangement although the func-
tions of the " presidency " have developed 
around the three ministers comprising the 
foreign minister who is chairman-in-office for 
six months, associated with his immediate pre-
decessor and successor. In the foreign ministry 
of the chairman-in-office room is provided for 
one official from each of the two other coun-
tries associated with the " presidency " for the 
time being. However, European political co-
operation remains outside the framework of the 
European Community treaties themselves, and 
two or three member countries at least have 
reservations about extending the defence func-
tions of this institution at the present time. 
The neutral position of Ireland remains a pro-
blem. 
(e) Independent European Programme Group 
5.17. The IEPG is yet another informal group-
ing, without treaty or international staff, in 
which all European NATO countries parti-
cipate. Concerned with European armaments 
production, and co-ordination with the NATO 
Conference of National Armaments Directors 
in pursuance of a two-way street in defence 
equipment between Europe and the United 
States, this is not a body which is likely to 
become involved in discussing more general 
aspects of European defence policy. 
VI. Defence production 
6.1. In measuring progress on the concept of a 
two-way street in defence equipment between 
the United States and its European allies, 
a concept formally adopted by the NATO 
Defence Planning Committee in May 1975, it is 
useful to compare the attitudes of the Carter 
and Reagan administrations. 
(a) The Carter administration 
6.2. A few days before Ronald Reagan arrived 
at the White House on 20th January 1981, 
a report on rationalisation/standardisation 
within NATO (report to the United States 
Congress, January 1981) by Mr. Harold Brown 
of the Carter administration, outgoing Secretary 
of Defence, was published. According to this 
report, the United States expects each NATO 
nation to do its fair share in support of the col-
lective defence of the West, but joint European 
defence production is considered to be the best 
means of improving the two-way street. The 
3 % formula goes hand in hand with a recom-
mendation that Europeans place their industries 
on a "united and collective basis". Yet 
Europe and North America are the two richest, 
most technologically advanced industrial econo-
mies in the world. Together we have a combi-
ned GNP more than twice that of the Warsaw 
Pact. If we were to pool our resources and 
efforts and pull together, we could produce a 
credible and capable coalition defence, without 
economic strain. In his address to the NATO 
summit in London in May 1977, President 
Carter emphasised that: 
" A common European defence produc-
tion effort would help to achieve econo-
mies of a scale beyond the reach of 
national programmes. A strengthened 
defence production base in Europe would 
enlarge the opportunities for two-way 
transatlantic traffic in defence equipment, 
while adding to the overall capabilities of 
the alliance. 
The Europeans have sought the econo-
mic benefits (jobs and technological pride 
and progress) of developing, producing 
and selling weapons to the United States 
in order to earn the foreign exchange 
needed to buy weapons from the United 
States. But here we confront a structural 
problem within Europe itself that com-
pounds the problems already mentioned. 
Only Britain and France (and in some 
areas, Germany) can produce weapons 
to a continental scale. No country in 
Europe can produce to an interconti-
nental scale. Thus the economies of 
scale in the alliance needs - and the 
benefits the Europeans seek - cannot 
be fully realised until (in the words of the 
Culver-Nunn Legislation) the European 
nations organise their defence procure-
ment on 'a united and collective basis'. 
Europe's fragmented defence industrial 
base also makes it difficult for its indus-
tries to develop and produce weapons 
competitive in quality, quantity and 
price with those produced in the United 
States. " 
6.3. The attitude towards the IEPG is not 
negative either: 
" As a result of the Eurogroup initiatives, 
the European members of the alliance 
established the Independent European 
Programme Group (IEPG) in February 
1976 with France as a full member. The 
Congress, in the Culver-Nunn Legislation 
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of July 1975, encouraged the European 
governments to accelerate their efforts to 
achieve European armaments collabora-
tion. President Carter at the London 
NATO summit in June 1977 also encou-
raged these collective European defence 
industrial efforts, and pledged to work 
with the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group as it gathered strength 
and cohesion. The United States has 
participated in a transatlantic dialogue 
with the IEPG in a series of meeting 
sponsored by the alliance as a whole. 
However, the IEPG has not developed 
into a strong device for co-ordinating 
European contributions to alliance arma-
ments development. " 
6.4. According to Mr. Brown's report, stan-
dardisation and interoperability are essential: 
" The challenges to standardisation and 
interoperability are many. In meeting 
them, we have had a number of impor-
tant successes in the past year. In our 
triad of rationalisation, standardisation 
and interoperability (RSI) initiatives, we 
signed the first memorandum of under-
standing (MOU) for a family of weapons, 
culminating two years of negotiations. 
We also made substantial progress 
towards a second family. We signed two 
more bilateral general reciprocal procure-
ment MOUs. Dual production of many 
major systems continues and is planned 
for other. The periodic armaments 
planning system (PAPS) and the NATO 
armaments planning review (NAPR) pro-
grammes have started, marking a major 
step toward an integrated and unified 
NATO arms planning system. The 
NATO airborne early warning and 
control programme is moving from plan-
ning to operational status. The alliance 
Conference of National Armaments 
Directors (CNAD) has become increas-
ingly active and effective in its support of 
arms co-operation programmes. The 
European national armaments directors 
and defence ministers strongly expressed 
their sense of progress and commitment 
to NATO co-operative programmes at 
their fall 1980 meetings. We also conti-
nue to revise DoD directives so that the 
principles of standardisation and inter-
operability are reflected in our internal 
standard operating procedures. More-
over, we are undertaking two major new 
initiatives: (1) reviewing the feasibility of 
establishing a second source in Europe 
for selected systems and (2) examining 
our foreign ownership, control or influ-
ence regulations and procedures and how 
they affect cross-national investment in 
arms industries. 
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Meeting challenges to standardisation/ 
interoperability 
To meet the challenges we have outlined, 
the United States has continued to take 
three primary approaches for increasing 
defence co-operation with allies: (1) reci-
procal procurement agreements, (2) dual 
production of weapons systems which 
have already been developed, and (3) 
sharing development of next-generation 
families of weapons. In addition, we are 
pursuing efforts at developing a NATO-
wide acquisition process, have continued 
to work on the NATO AEW &C pro-
gramme, and are working toward produc-
tion of a multiple-launch rocket system. 
We have also begun a programme by 
which DoD evaluates weapons and tech-
nologies of our allies in terms of potential 
utilisation in the United States in order 
to save research and development funds. 
Finally, the Conference of National 
Armaments Directors (CNAD) has been 
extremely active in the past year. We 
continued to make substantial progress in 
all of these areas. " 
6.5. Mr. Brown considers results achieved in 
1980 to be satisfactory: 
" The past year has been one of great 
success in NATO standardisation and 
interoperability. The momentum that 
has been building for several years has 
resulted in a rapid movement forward. 
Under the triad of initiatives, we have 
signed our first family of weapons MOU 
and have almost completed all of the 
reciprocal general procurement MOUs. 
Dual production of systems has proven 
most valuable. The CNAD has been 
extremely active with PAPS and NAPR 
now activated. The NATO AEW &C 
programme is nearing operational status 
and other new initiatives are under way. 
Congress has provided important support 
for United States and alliance efforts at 
standardisation and interoperability. In 
sum, 1980 was a year in which many of 
our efforts came to fruition and others 
are being refined and/or are nearing ful-
filment. " 
6.6. Where armaments co-operation is concer-
ned, Mr. Brown's analysis lays greater emphasis 
on progress accomplished than on the imba-
lance of trade between the United States and 
Europe: 
" The alliance has made significant pro-
gress toward greater co-operation in ar-
maments. The Conference of National 
Armaments Directors has become a 
much stronger organisation which is now 
24 
working on major co-operative program-
mes for the future. Under its auspices, 
the family of weapons concept promises a 
more efficient division of effort in the 
field of weapons development. The first 
family of weapons agreement signed in 
August 1980 covers air-to-air missiles 
and provides for the Europeans to deve-
lop an advanced short-range missile while 
the United States develops an advanced 
medium-range missile. Thus, the family 
of weapons has moved from concept to 
reality within four years. Also, the 
United States has negotiated bilateral 
MOUs for reciprocal procurement of 
defence equipment with individual allies 
(eleven have been signed, and one is 
pending). These agreements are designed 
to improve open competition in systems 
acquisition by waiving buy-national and 
other restrictive provisions. Ongoing or 
pending co-operative programmes include: 
(A) Dual production in the United 
States: Roland air defence system, 
HAG-58 armour machine gun, 120 mm 
tank gun, CFM engine (KC-135 re-
engining), squad automatic weapon. 
(B) Dual production in Europe: F-16, 
MOD Flir, M438, improved conventional 
munition; Stinger man-portable air defence 
system, AIM-9L improved short-range 
air-to-air missile, Patriot. 
(C) Co-operative programmes: NATO 
AWACS, multiple-launch rocket systems 
(MLRS), rolling air frame (RAM), NATO 
small arms ammunition. " 
6. 7. Mr. Brown therefore asks for the support 
of Congress: 
" The Department of Defence appreciates 
the support Congress has given NATO 
rationalisation I standardisation I inter-
operability. Our efforts in this regard 
continue to be bolstered by the Congres-
sional affirmation in the FY 77 Defence 
Appropriation Act that it is United States 
policy for equipment procured by the 
United States for use in NATO to be 
standardised or at least interoperable with 
that of our allies and that progress toward 
realisation of standardisationlinteropera-
bility objectives would be enhanced by 
expanded inter-allied procurement of 
arms and equipment within NATO and 
greater reliance on licensing and copro-
duction." 
(b) The Reagan administration 
6.8. With the Reagan administration the Uni-
ted States seems not only to be keeping up 
the transatlantic dialogue but also wishing to 
strengthen it, recognising its political import-
ance for the Atlantic Alliance. This was affir-
med by Mr. Richard De Lauer, United States 
Under-Secretary of Defence, at the CNAD 
meeting in Brussels on 5th May 1981. The 
Reagan administration strongly supports United 
States and NATO arms co-operation program-
mes but apparently, unlike the Carter adminis-
tration, lays greater stress on the fact that 
industry must play a more active role in the 
process of armaments co-operation than on the 
need for widespread intra-European co-opera-
tion so that Europe may become a real 
competitor for the United States. 
6.9. The programme of the symposium on 
industrial co-operation with NATO, held in 
Brussels in April 1983, also offers a number of 
ideas, for instance: 
"(a) review of mandatory DoD contract 
clauses and subcontract flow-down 
provisions to delete those which are 
inapplicable or unnecessary for 
contractors/subcontractors located 
outside the United States; 
(b) negotiation of ' contract adminis-
tration' and 'pricing/auditing' an-
nexes to general MOUs to pro-
vide for reciprocal exchange of 
government services 
- audit agreements exist for France 
and United Kingdom 
- first contract administration an-
nex signed with the Netherlands 
in April 1982 ; 
(c) strong emphasis on ' industry-to-
industry ' seminars to explore mu-
tual business opportunities ; 
(d) defence acquisition circular 
no. 76-25, issued on 31st October 
1980 
- first major change to section VI 
' Foreign acquisitions ' in over 
20 years 
- includes all NATO general 
MOUs 
- creates new part 14 ' Purchases 
from NATO participating sour-
ces' 
- waives ' Buy American Act '; cus-
toms duties etc. 
- stresses open subcontracting with 
NATO sources. " 
6.10. Mr. Weinberger, United States Secretary 
of Defence, in his report on the allied contribu-
tion to the common defence (Department of 
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Defence, March 1982) considers that NATO 
has developed major programmes for improving 
the alliance's defence capability: 
" These are the coproduction, dual pro-
duction and families of weapons pro-
grammes. These programmes provide 
for the sharing of development and pro-
duction costs and can produce substantial 
savings in R&D expenditures. Such 
savings can improve the industrial base 
in the United States, Canada and Europe 
and assist technology transfer within the 
alliance. These transfers take place in 
both directions - from Europe to the 
United States and from the United States 
to Europe. " 
Major examples quoted by Mr. Weinberger are 
United States procurement of the MAG-58 
machine gun and the 120 mm smooth bore 
tank gun. He underlines that Europeans have 
derived benefits from coproduction in the 
framework of the F-16 aircraft programme: 
" Both sides may benefit from future air-
to-air missile weapons families. Dual 
production, coproduction and the family 
of weapons programmes enable industry 
to distribute large R&D costs, to reap the 
benefits of economies of scale and to 
share in advanced technology." 
6.11. Unlike Mr. Brown, he also stresses the 
problem caused by the imbalance in the equip-
ment trade between the United States and its 
partners: 
" In 1980, eight major NATO trading 
partners (Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway 
and the United Kingdom) accepted Uni-
ted States manufactured defence equip-
ment deliveries amounting to $1.85b. In 
contrast, the United States accepted deli-
veries on only $0.20b from those same 
NATO countries - a ratio of 9.4:1 
favouring the United States. The com-
parable ratio was 5.3:1 in 1977 and has 
been increasing consistently since then in 
favour of the United States." 
6.12. In the report standardisation of equip-
ment within NATO (report to the United States 
Congress, January 1983), Mr. Weinberger com-
ments on the efforts of the Department of 
Defence and NATO allies to standardise, or at 
least make interoperable, equipment (including 
weapons systems, ammunition and fuel) of 
allied forces committed to NATO. Mr. Wein-
berger considers progress has been made in the 
effort to strengthen alliance conventional forces 
and to adapt the alliance defence posture to the 
changing needs of the 1980s: 
" Improvements in NATO planning pro-
cedures are contributing to the process of 
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improving standardisation and interoper-
ability within NATO. NATO has 
agreed to explore urgently ways to 
improve its conventional defence by 
taking advantage of emerging technolo-
gies. " 
6.13. Mr. Weinberger considers it necessary to: 
" ... improve NATO's efforts to allocate 
development of related weapon types to 
specific allies under the family of wea-
pons concept. Artificial barriers to trade 
in defence equipment must be removed 
under the reciprocal memoranda of 
understanding that we have with our 
allies. 
Coproduction may be selectively 
employed to provide industrial parti-
cipation to allies who agree to adopt 
standardised systems. 
Finally, the two-way street/armaments 
co-operation must be made a reality 
through increased trade in defence equip-
ment in both directions across the Atlan-
tic resulting in benefits to NATO as a 
whole." 
6.14. Another difference between Mr. Wein-
berger's approach (see abovementioned text) 
and that of Mr. Brown is the emphasis he 
places on the need for a major leadership role 
for industry (in this process) and his desire to 
see a reduction in obstacles to direct industry-
to-industry agreements. 
6.15. In the United States, it has been decided 
that the determination of allied governments is 
not enough. It is also necessary to obtain Uni-
ted States Congress backing and ensure a will 
on the part of American industry to carry out 
European projects jointly. Anxiety about 
unemployment also carries great weight in this 
analysis. Mr. Weinberger concludes the intro-
duction to the abovementioned report with 
remarks about Congress's attitude: 
"We welcome the positive statement of 
the Congress for greater co-operation 
with our allies as expressed in the FY 
1983 Defence Authorisation Act. 
We will intensify consultations to meet 
these objectives. At the same time we 
solicit the assistance of Congress in elimi-
nation of obstacles to co-operation, e.g. 
specialty metals legislation which is 
seriously undermining NATO's arms co-
operation efforts. " 
6.16. Nevertheless the rhetoric exceeds tenfold 
the practical progress made towards achieving 
an equitable two-way street. True there are 
notable examples of European equipment's 
being accepted for the United States armed for-
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ces but primarily where the European produce 
was outstanding such as the Harrier for the 
United States Marine Corps, the Hawk for the 
United States navy and the CF-56 powerplant 
for the KC-135 tankers of Strategic Air Com-
mand. 
6.17. Surprisingly, amendments in favour of 
NATO industrial co-operation like the Roth-
Glenn-Nunn Amendment (Appendix VI) can 
be passed by the Senate and yet amendments 
like the Speciality Metals Amendments and the 
Defence Appropriations Bill are carried which 
do immense damage to the prospects of the 
procurement of European equipment by the 
United States armed forces and to transatlantic 
relations. 
6.18. The Europeans do not help their own 
cause by their slow progress towards interopera-
bility, standardisation, and joint development 
and procurement. The IEPG has had great 
difficulty, inevitably, in harmonising national 
operational requirements and procurement 
time-scales. Some promising examples exist of 
greater co-operation such as the Tornado pro-
gramme or the new generation of collaborative 
anti-tank guided weapons. Others such as the 
tortoise-like progress towards a new European 
combat aircraft for the Italian air force, Luft-
waffe and Royal Air Force show how hard 
it is even for the Europeans to concert their 
procurement among themselves let alone with 
the United States. 
(c) Conclusions 
6.19. Both the democratic and republican 
administrations placed and are placing empha-
sis on the need for standardisation and/or at 
least interoperability of allied equipment. Both 
show interest in the principle of the two~way 
street, considered to be essential for enhancing 
the defence capability of the alliance itself. 
6.20. However, there are differences of tone or 
rather of emphasis in the two approaches. 
Mr. Carter's administration underlined the idea 
that large-scale intra-European co-operation 
could have been a means of making Europe a 
true competitor for the United States. The 3 % 
formula goes hand in hand with this idea. The 
Reagan administration makes more direct refer-
ence to the imbalance of trade between the 
United States and Europe but in its strong 
desire to pursue cross-Atlantic industrial team-
ing does not mention the expediency of 
intra-European co-operation (at least in the 
reports examined by your Rapporteur) and, 
although on the one hand it proposes to repeal 
the Buy American Act, on the other hand it 
vigorously asserts the need for a " major lea-
dership role for industry " and a reduction in 
" obstacles to direct industry-to-industry agree-
ments". 
VII. Forces of WEU countries 
(a) General 
7 .1. This section briefly summarises the forces 
which the WEU countries make available for 
allied defence. There are of course other 
important forces in Europe: those of the United 
States and of the other European NATO coun-
tries - Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, 
Greece and Turkey. 
(b) Belgium 
7 .2. The Belgian forces, which include con-
scripts, are mostly NATO-assigned in pea~e­
time. A significant element of the Be~gian 
corps is stationed in the Federal Republic of 
Germany in peacetime and comes under the 
command of the NATO Northern Army 
Group, but there is some doubt about con-
tinued Belgian participation in the vita~ Haw.k 
SAM screen in Germany. The Belgian air 
force is largely under command ?f the 2n~ 
Tactical Air Force of NATO. BelgiUm contn-
butes a parachute battalion group to th~ ACE 
Mobile Force and transports them m the 
C-130s of its air force. The small but modern 
naval force usually contributes a frigate to the 
peacetime Standing Force Atlantic and mine-
sweepers to the Standing Force Channel. ~~e­
ther with the Netherlands they form a JOint 
minesweeping force for their coastal wa.ters. In 
developing situations, reserve formations are 
formed to reinforce the NATO-assigned forces, 
or to provide a force under national con~rol for 
internal defence, and for the protectiOn of 
national lines of communication. In wartime 
all naval ships will operate under NATO 
control. 
(c) France 
7.3. France, although a member of the NATO 
alliance does not assign forces to NATO and 
does n~t participate in the integrated military 
structure, although elements of thes.e forces pa~­
ticipate from time-to-time on a bilateral basis 
in military exercises outside. the NA.T<? ar~a 
with allied nations. There IS conscnpt10n m 
France. France maintains an army corps in 
Germany, consisting of th~ee divisions, and a 
garrison in Berlin at battalion strength. Some 
corps troops are stationed in north-east 
France. Two army corps headquarters a~d 
some eleven other divisions are located m 
France and their army is tasked to defend 
French territory in war. The French navy will 
eventually have six nuclear missile submarines 
for deterrence; Jaguar aircraft squadrons, and of 
course the ballistic missiles at the Plateau d' Al-
bion installation, and nuclear-capable Mirage-IV 
aircraft also serve this purpose. Besides having 
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some twenty-eight conventional submarines, the 
navy possesses two conventional aircra~-car­
riers and some forty-four destroyers, fngates 
and ' corvettes. The naval air arm has a 
total of some 200 aircraft, some that are car-
rier-borne and others that are engaged in 
maritime surveillance. The French air force is 
based in France, although there is normally a 
detachment at Djibouti. The French air force 
consists of some 700 combat aircraft and there 
are about 300 aircraft in the transport or 
liaison role. The French army has already des-
patched a contingent to join the United Nations 
peacekeeping force in Lebanon. It alwa~s. has 
units at readiness to meet requests for military 
aid at typically brigade group strengt~ with the 
necessary air force support for countnes such. as 
Chad who have a military aid agreement With 
France. French forces at battalion strength are 
stationed in Guyana, at Kourou, and in 
Mururoa Oceana, and are mainly employed in 
' . . the engineer role. French overseas temto1:1es, 
which are administered as part of metropolitan 
France, have their own local defence forces in 
which local conscript soldiers serve. 
(d) Federal Republic of Germany 
7.4. Almost without exception, the armed ~or­
ces of the Federal Republic of Germany, which 
include conscripts, are based in the Fe?e.ral 
Republic. The army, howev~r, has. a trammg 
facility in Canada and the .Umted Kin~dom for 
tank formations and the au force, until recen-
tly, has maintained an F-104 pilo~ train~ng 
facility in the United States of Amenca which 
will be closed due to the establishment of a new 
facility in the United Kingdom for t!'3ining 
Tornado pilots at RAF Cottesmore for aucrews 
of the Luftwaffe, German naval air arm, Italian 
air force and RAF. 
7 .5. For the defence of the Federal Republic's 
eastern frontier, the land forces place an army 
corps size formation under Northern Army 
Group and two army corps under the command 
of the Central Army Group. A further forma-
tion operates in the Jutland area under the 
command of Allied Forces Northern Europe. 
Reserve formations are assembled during deve-
loping situations to reinf~rce. NATO and to 
protect lines of commumcation. The ~aval 
forces consist of some twenty-four conventional 
submarines, twenty frigates and destro¥ers! an.d 
some fifty light fast-patrol craft. Their ~ole IS 
to maintain naval superiority of the Baltic Sea 
and the Kattegat and to operate in the North 
Sea; they contribute units to the Standing For~e 
Atlantic and the Standing Force Channel m 
peacetime. 
7 .6. The navy is supported by some twenty 
maritime patrol aircraft and has some 100 
shore-based 104-G fighters which are being gra-
dually replaced by Tornado aircraft. 
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7. 7. The air force possesses some 600 combat 
aircraft, most of which are assigned to NATO 
and serve in the 2nd and the 4th Tactical Air 
Forces. There is a detachment of the Luft-
waffe with an air-sea rescue capability at 
the NATO training base at Decimomannu, 
Sardinia. 
(e) Luxembourg 
7 .8. Luxembourg provides a regimental com-
bat team, which includes conscripts, which is 
normally assigned to the ACE Mobile Force 
but is transported by the air forces of other 
NATO countries. 
(j) Italy 
7.9. Italy confines its forces almost entirely to 
the defence of its territory and its immediate 
coastal waters. It is fair to say that the three 
services of the Italian forces, which include 
conscripts, are to all intents and purposes 
assigned to NATO. They comprise an army 
corps based in the north of Italy, and twenty-
five squadrons of aircraft, totalling some 
300 combat machines, some of which have a 
maritime rOle. Italy possesses a fleet of 
twenty-seven warships and a number of fast 
attack craft. There remains about three 
brigades under national command for internal 
defence in wartime. The Italians, at the 
moment, are contributing to the United Nations 
peacekeeping force in Lebanon and they 
provide contingents for the ACE Mobile Force 
which they airlift in their own aircraft. 
(g) Netherland! 
7.10. The Netherlands armed forces, which 
include conscripts, are mainly based in that 
country, although a naval picket ship is 
normally on station in the Netherlands Antilles 
with a detachment of marines, and one or two 
maritime aircraft for air-sea rescue and coastal 
suryeillance tasks are based there. The army 
assigns an army corps to NATO, consisting of 
an armoured division and two infantry divi-
sions. The navy contributes units to the Stand-
ing Force Atlantic and Standing Force Channel. 
Their minesweeping effort works jointly with 
that of Belgium. The fleet of some fifteen des-
tr<?yers and .frigates, s1:1ppo~ed by fleet supply 
ships and SIX submannes, IS also assigned to 
NATO. Two squadrons of maritime patrol 
aircraft are available. The air force has some 
200 combat aircraft and is almost completely 
under NATO command. 
(h) United Kingdom 
7.11. The United Kingdom considers that the 
support of NATO is the principal role of its 
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regular armed forces. On the European conti-
nent a corps, comprising three divisions and an 
artillery division, is assigned to NATO. The 
logistical support of these formations remains 
under national control. This British effort is 
called the British Army of the Rhine, and in 
1982 was at an average peacetime strength of 
some 58,600 men. 1 The Brussels Treaty 
imposes an obligation upon the United King-
dom to station an army of the equivalent 
of four divisions and a tactical air force on the 
continent. The Royal Air Force maintains a 
number of air bases in Germany on which some 
160 combat aircraft are stationed in peacetime. 
These are assigned to the 2nd Tactical Air 
Force of NATO. Reforming in the United 
~n~?om at thi~ .moment is the 2nd Infantry 
DIVISion, compnsmg regular and reserve briga-
des and of course their supporting arms. 
This formation is to reinforce BAOR when 
required. The United Kingdom has its own 
air defence capability which operates under 
NATO. The United Kingdom maintains a 
brigade in Berlin and a strong presence of all 
three arms of service in the Falklands at 
brigade strength. A battalion-sized garrison is 
kept in Gibraltar together with naval elements 
to support fleet operations in the Mediterranean 
if required. A battalion group, with a detach-
!Dent of Harrier ~ircr~ft and a naval picket ship, 
IS based on Behze m Central America. The 
United Kingdom is able to provide a contribu-
tion to the ACE Mobile Force - usually Royal 
Marines - for deployment on the flanks of 
NATO and able to engage in Arctic warfare if 
required. 
7.12. Naval elements are provided to the 
Standing Force Atlantic and the Standing Force 
Channel. Contributions are made to the Uni-
ted Nations peacekeeping forces in Cyprus and 
Lebano':l, the United Kingdom base in Cyprus 
supportmg this force. The British forces are 
required to provide training support for certain 
former colonies and the Gulf states. Certain 
units of the forces assigned to NATO are 
detached for duty in Northern Ireland in order 
t~ maintain law and order in a paramilitary 
role. 
7.~3. Maritime aircraft, operating from United 
Kingdom shores, are able to maintain surveil-
lance over a wide sea area, particularly the 
Faroes gap and the Denmark Strait and are able 
to engage hostile naval submarine and surface 
units. Airborne early warning aircraft extend 
the United Kingdom surveillance capability. 
The United Kingdom possesses its own nuclear 
dete.rr~nt i~ .the form o_f four nuclear-powered 
balhstic-missde submannes which each carry 
sixteen Polaris missiles, which is to be modern-
1. Twenty-eighth annual report of the CoUJlcil, 
Document 942, page 11. 
ised towards the end of this decade through 
the construction of four new nuclear-powered 
ballistic-missile submarines and the procure-
ment of a complement of Trident D5 missiles 
for them. 
(i) ACE Mobile Force 
7.14. The committee has frequently drawn 
attention in the past to the political importance 
of Allied Command Europe Mobile Force 
(AMF) which, when activated, draws on spe-
cially trained and equipped units supplied by 
all WEU countries (except France), the United 
States and Canada. In a crisis it can be rapidly 
deployed by air to either NATO flank to pro-
vide a military demonstration of the political 
solidarity of the alliance. The force comprises , 
a land component of brigade group size drawn 
from infantry battalions and support units sup-
plied by Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, and an air component of some 
four squadrons one of which is provided by the 
Netherlands. AMF is a tangible demonstration 
of burden-sharing in a joint allied force and it is 
essential that participating countries meet their 
commitments. At present the land component 
needs more local air defence, and the Luxem-
bourg infantry battalion - the only military unit 
which Luxembourg contributes to NATO - is 
at less than half strength. 
VIII. Nuclear weapons. 
8.1. The committee is to prepare a separate 
report on all aspects of nuclear weapons for the 
second part of the session in November; it last 
reported in detail in May 1982 1• The present 
chapter merely records the present levels of 
nuclear weapons, the status of modernisa-
tion and improvement programmes and the 
relevant arms control negotiations. 
(a) Cu"ent le,els of nuclear weapons 
8.2. Current information on levels of nuclear 
weapons by categories is given at Appendix 
VIII - estimates for autumn 1982 with some 
updating. 
(b) INF debate 
8.3. The INF debate goes back at least to the 
late 1950s when the Soviet Union began 
deployment of some 600 SS-4 and SS-5 
medium-range missiles while NATO deployed 
comparable Thor missiles in the United King-
dom and Jupiter missiles in Italy and Turkey, 
and had primitive cruise missiles of the day -
I. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe, Docu-
ment 918, 19th May 1982. 
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Matador and later Mace - deployed in Ger-
many. With the entry into service of ICBMs, 
however, these NATO weapons systems were 
rapidly considered obsolescent and were phased 
out by 1963, reliance being placed both on the 
United States ICBM and SLBM force and on 
aircraft including the forward-based F-Ill in 
the United Kingdom, the FB-lllA in the Uni-
ted States, and carrier-borne aircraft. 
8.4. NATO began a re-examination of the 
theatre nuclear force (as it was then called) 
position in the light of the appearance of the 
Soviet Backfire bomber from 1974 and SS-20 
missile from 1977. A high level group under 
United States chairmanship was established in 
NATO and considered NATO force improve-
ment proposals ranging from 200 to 600 mis-
siles. In April 1979, NATO established a 
similar special group to examine the arms 
control aspects of theatre nuclear forces. At 
the conclusion of these deliberations a special 
meeting of NATO foreign and defence minis-
ters announced the " dual track " decision on 
12th December 1979 whereby NATO decided 
on the deployment in Europe of 572 United 
States nuclear missiles distributed as follows : 
Country GLCM Pershing II Total 
Belgium 48 48 
48 Netherlands 48 
Germany 96 108 204 
Italy 112 
United Kingdom 160 
112 
160 
TOTAL 464 108 572 
8.5. The communique said : 
" As an integral part of TNF moderni-
sation, 1,000 United States nuclear war-
heads will be withdrawn from Europe 
as soon as feasible... The 572 LRTNF 
warheads should be accommodated 
within that reduced level. " 
8.6. The communique stressed the importance 
of arms control and supported the United States 
decision to negotiate LR TNF limitations with 
the Soviet Union along the following lines : 
"A. Any future limitations on United 
States systems principally designed for 
theatre missions should be accompanied 
by appropriate limitations on Soviet thea-
tre systems. 
B. Limitation on United States and 
Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems 
should be negotiated bilaterally in the 
SALT II framework in a step-by-step 
approach. 
C. The immediate objective of these 
negotiations should be the establishment 
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of agreed limitations on United States 
and Soviet land-based long-range theatre 
nuclear missile systems. 
D. Any agreed limitations on these sys-
tems must be consistent with the prin-
ciple of equality between the sides. 
Therefore, the limitations should take the 
form of de jure equality in ceilings and in 
rights. 
E. Any agreed limitations must be ade-
quately verifiable. " 
8.7. The communique concluded: 
" 11. The ministers have decided to 
pursue these two parallel and comple-
mentary approaches in order to avert an 
arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet 
TNF build-up, yet preserve the viability 
of NATO's strategy of deterrence and 
defence and thus maintain the security of 
its member states. 
A. A modernisation decision, including a 
commitment to deployments is necessary 
to meet NATO's deterrence and defence 
needs, to provide a credible response to 
unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and 
to provide the foundation for the pursuit 
of serious negotiations on TNF. 
B. Success of arms control in constrain-
ing the Soviet build-up can enhance 
alliance security, modify the scale of 
NATO's TNF requirements, and pro-
mote stability and detente in Europe in 
consonance with NATO's basic policy 
of deterrence, defence and detente as 
enunciated in the Harmel report. 
NATO's TNF requirements will be exa-
mined in the light of concrete results 
reached through negotiations. " 
8.8. Deployment of the United States missiles 
is to begin at the end of 1983 and site construc-
tion is in progress in the United Kingdom and 
Italy. There have been conflicting reports of 
progress in development of Pershing II and the 
Tomahawk GLCM in the United States. Bel-
gium and the Netherlands have reserved a final 
decision on deployment in their countries pend-
ing an assessment of progress in the INF 
negotiations. 
8.9. The bilateral INF talks opened in 
Geneva towards the end of 1980, under the 
Carter administration, and were then adjourned 
for a year until 30th November 1981 while the 
Reagan administration considered its negotia-
ting position. On 21st October 1981 the 
NATO Nuclear Planning Group formulated 
NATO's zero option position : " On the basis 
of reciprocity the zero level remains a possible 
option under ideal circumstances ... ". Presi-
dent Reagan defined the zero option in more 
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detail in a speech on 18th November 1981 : 
" The United States is prepared to cancel its 
deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched 
cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their 
SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. " 
8.10. The SS-20 missile has been deployed 
both in European Soviet Union and around the 
Urals, from both of which sites it is within 
range of Europe, and about one-third out of 
range of Europe near Mongolia. The United 
States has made it clear that the zero option 
would require the Soviet Union to dismantle all 
SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles whether in range 
of Europe or of China and Japan, particularly 
stressing that some of these missiles are a threat 
to Japan and other Asian countries. 
8.11. On 30th March 1983, President Reagan, 
apparently responding to urgings from most 
European allies, announced that the United 
States had informed the Soviet Union in the 
INF talks in Geneva that the United States was 
" prepared to negotiate an interim agreement in 
which the United States would substantially 
reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II 
and GLCM provided the Soviet Union reduce 
the number of its warheads on longer-range 
INF missiles to an equal level on a global 
basis ", and had proposed that the talks, which 
had adjourned for Easter, resume on 17th May. 
The zero option remained on the table. 
Press reports had earlier suggested the proposals 
would imply an interim level of 300 INF war-
heads on each side, but the statement made no 
reference to numbers, nor did it link an interim 
agreement to Soviet acceptance of zero levels as 
the ultimate aim. By referring to " a global 
basis", the statement included all Soviet INF 
systems in the Far East as well as Europe. 
8.12. The public position of the Soviet Union 
on the INF talks had been Mr. Andropov's ear-
lier statement of 21st December 1982, key 
excerpts from which are : 
"... We have suggested an agreement 
renouncing all types of nuclear weapons 
- both medium-range and tactical -
designed to strike targets in Europe ... 
We have also suggested another variant: 
that the USSR and the NATO countries 
reduce their medium-range weaponry by 
more than two-thirds. So far the United 
States will not have it... It has submitted 
a proposal which, as if in mockery, is 
called a zero option. It envisages elimi-
nation of all Soviet medium-range mis-
siles not only in the European, but also 
in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, 
while NATO's arsenal of nuclear missiles 
in Europe is to remain intact and may 
even be increased... We ... will conti-
nue to work for an agreement on a basis 
that is fair to both sides. We are prepa-
red, among other things, to agree that the 
Soviet Union should retain in Europe 
only as many missiles as are kept there 
by Britain and France - and not a single 
one more. This means that the Soviet 
Union would cut down by hundreds of 
missiles, including dozens of the latest 
missiles, known in the West as 
SS-20... If later the number of British 
and French missiles were scaled down, 
the number of Soviet ones would be addi-
tionally reduced by just as many. Along 
with this there must also be an accord 
on reducing to equal levels on both sides 
the number of medium-range nuclear-
delivery aircraft stationed in this region 
by both the USSR and the NATO coun-
tries. " 
8.13. At a rare televised Moscow press confer-
ence on 2nd April, Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet 
Foreign Minister, rejected President Reagan's 
proposals of 30th March, stressing that it 
would give NATO a 2.5 to I superiority over 
the Warsaw Pact in warheads on all INF 
systems. He reiterated the demand for British 
and French nuclear forces, and United States 
forward based systems, to be taken into 
account. He rejected the " global " basis of the 
United States proposal to cover Soviet systems 
in Asia, pointing out that the Soviet Union was 
surrounded "by a ring of United States bases" 
where United States "medium-range nuclear 
weapons are deployed". The latest public 
statement of the Soviet position was contained 
in Mr. Andropov's speech at a dinner in 
Moscow for the East German leader, 
Mr. Honecker, on 3rd May 1983, in which he 
offered to count warheads, as well as missiles, 
but still insisted on British and French nuclear 
forces being taken into account, and on limiting 
the scope of an agreement to Soviet weapons 
" in the European part of the Soviet 
Union". The real Soviet negotiating position 
will be explored only when the bilateral talks 
resume in Geneva on 17th May. 
8.14. United States press reports of 16th and 
20th January 1983 said Mr. Nitze, the United 
States INF negotiator, had discussed an infor-
mal agreement with his Soviet counterpart, 
Mr. Kvitsinsky, in July 1982 whereby the 
United States would forego all planned INF 
missile deployments in Europe if the Soviet 
Union reduced its INF missiles in range of 
Europe from 500 to 50, and froze those in 
range of China and Japan at the present level of 
I 00. The proposal was said to have been 
rejected by the Soviet Union and not subse-
quently endorsed by the United States author-
ities. 
8.15. Opposition circles in the United States 
and some European countries have regarded 
the " zero-zero " option as unrealistic on 
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the grounds that the Soviet Union has had 
600 intermediate-range missiles deployed since 
the early 1960s and cannot be expected to 
reduce these weapons to zero in exchange for 
the non-deployment by NATO of weapons that 
do not yet exist. Mr. Paul Warnke, the 
former Director of United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, and negotiator of 
SALT II, has proposed that : 
" I. all intermediate-range missiles be 
taken into account, regardless of nationa-
lity or whether launched from the land or 
sea; and 
2. the United States would cancel the 
Pershing II and GLCM deployment if the 
Soviets reduced an equivalent number of 
warheads. " 1 
This would involve the dismantling by the 
Soviet Union of all 280 remaining obsolete 
SS-4 and SS-5 missiles and about I 00 of the 
SS-20 missiles. " The result would be equili-
brium between the Soviet land-based force of 
SS-20 missiles and the western (British, French 
and American) sea-based missiles of interme-
diate range. The Soviets would have 215 
SS-20 missiles (100 of which would remain 
targeted only on China or Japan) carrying 645 
warheads, and the West would have 184 mis-
siles carrying 544 warheads. (There are also 
eighteen land-based French IRBMs and 
approximately thirty Soviet SS-N-5 
SLBMs.)" Mr. Denis Healey, in his address to 
the WEU Assembly Socialist Group in Decem-
ber 1982, specifically endorsed Mr. Warnke's 
proposals. 
8.16. Reports of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments on a number of 
occasions have endorsed both aspects of the 
NATO dual track decision of December 1979, 
but have stressed that any attempt to measure 
"nuclear balance" between East and West can 
only be done globally, taking account of all 
categories of nuclear weapons on both sides, 
because of the great complexity of defining 
categories of nuclear weapon which should be 
deemed " of interest " to the European thea-
tre. Reports have similarly stressed that for 
deterrent purposes reliance must be placed on 
the whole range of nuclear weapons available to 
the West, so as to avoid any risk of "decoup-
ling" the United States strategic deterrent 
through mistaken reliance on a supposed sepa-
rate nuclear balance within Europe. Any 
agreement on the reduction of weapons on the 
other hand would almost certainly have to be 
limited to narrow categories of weapons sys-
tems. Reports have stressed that although 
there can be no question of France or the Uni-
I. Source: Committee for National Security - statement 
released on 16th September 1982. 
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ted Kingdom accepting reductions in the pre-
sent relatively small levels of their nuclear wea-
pons, while levels of Soviet and United States 
weapons remain very large, nevertheless exist-
ing numbers of British and French weapons are 
inevitably taken into account by the Soviet 
Union in its own assessment of the balance. 
(c) Strategic nuclear weapons 
8.17. As part of the United States strategic 
force modernisation programme the air-laun-
ched cruise missile became operational for the 
first time on 16th December 1982 when a 
squadron of fourteen specially marked B-52s 
were fitted with twelve ALCM each, the first of 
201 B-52s earmarked to carry ALCM of which 
4,348 have been ordered 1• The special mark-
ing of the B-52s in accordance with SALT II 
is to permit external verification. Plans for 
deployment of the controversial MX ICBM are 
still in abeyance pending further decisions on 
the basing mode. A bi-partisan Presidential 
Commission on Strategic Forces appointed by 
President Reagan, under the chairmanship of 
retired Air Force General Brent Scowcroft, 
reported on 12th April that the Soviet ability to 
destroy United States land-based missiles (as 
claimed by the Reagan administration) was 
theoretical only, because of" problems of ope-
ration accuracies " and " planning uncertain-
ties ". The commission recognised that rea-
sonable survivability of ICBMs " may not out-
last this century", that the MX could not be 
invulnerable, but that 100 should be deployed 
in Minuteman silos, and that a new small 
mobile ICBM with only one warhead should be 
developed. On 17th December 1982 the forty-
eight British Vulcan bombers were withdrawn 
from service. 
8.18. The SALT II Treaty negotiated during 
the successive presidencies of Nixon, Ford and 
Carter, signed by the last on 18th June 1979, 
has not been ratified. The Reagan adminis-
tration has found it " fatally flawed " but decla-
red that it will not " undercut " it provided the 
Soviet Union does not do so either. SALT II 
was signed on the assumption that negotiations 
on a SALT III, to include restrictions on thea-
tre or forward-based nuclear systems, would 
have started at once, and the attitude of the 
United States Administration to the protocol to 
SALT II is not clear. The protocol would 
have expired on the last day of 1981 and for-
bids : (i) the deployment or testing of mobile 
ICBMs; (ii) the deployment of GLCMs or 
SLCMs with a range greater than 600 km; or 
1. Press reports have suggested the existing ALCM will 
shortly become vulnerable to Soviet A WACS and improved 
defences; it will be replaced by a new model with small 
radar image. 
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the testing of such missiles with MIRV s; 
(iii) the testing or deployment of air-to-surface 
ballistic missiles. 
8.19. United States proposals for reductions of 
strategic nuclear weapons in the START talks, 
proceeding parallel to the INF talks in Geneva, 
were announced by President Reagan on 9th 
May 1982 in general terms, concentrating 
on a reduction in ICBMs, the category in which 
the Soviet Union is superior to the United 
States. Officials at that time said the proposal 
was for a common ceiling of 850 ballistic mis-
siles (SLBMs plus ICBMs) with a total of not 
more than 5,000 warheads, of which only 500 
warheads could be on ICBMs. This was said 
to involve a reduction of 1 ,500 Soviet missiles 
and 1,300 warheads compared with a reduction 
of 850 United States missiles and 2,200 war-
heads, the reductions to be carried out over ten 
years. 
8.20. Mr. Andropov, in his speech of 21st 
December 1982, proposed a 25 % reduction in 
all strategic weapons of both sides, restrictions 
on improvements to nuclear weapons, and a 
freeze at present levels while negotiations were 
in progress. Comments in Pravda of 2nd 
January 1983 pointed out that this proposal 
amounted to a 25 % reduction in the ceilings of 
SALT II to leave each side with a combined 
total of 1 ,800 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy 
bombers by 1990. The Soviet Union has 
proposed a total ban on all new types of 
strategic weapon including ALCM, GLCM and 
SLCM. 
IX. Conclusions 
9 .1. The present burden-sharing problem 
arises chiefly because of differences in the way 
that the European allies on the one hand and 
the present United States administration on the 
other approach relations with the Soviet Union, 
differences which lead to differing views as to 
the necessary size of the total allied defence 
effort. 
9.2. Because of these difficulties the com-
mittee fully recognises that there is a greater 
need for defence consultation between Euro-
pean allies and for a more equal political rela-
tionship between the European members and 
the United States. The relative merits of WEU 
and the Eurogroup as a forum for discussion 
among European allies are examined in Chap-
ter V above and the committee's conclu-
sions are presented in paragraphs A.4 and B of 
the draft recommendation and in the draft reso-
lution. There is a need for the European posi-
tion to be expounded clearly in the United 
States, especially to Congress committees and 
staffs, through a public relations effort co-
ordinated by the Washington embassies of the 


APPENDIX I 
B. MANPOWER EFFORT- 1982 
Period of compulsory • 
military service 
(months) 
Army Navy Air force 
Belgium }03 10 3 10 3 
France 12 4 12 4 12 4 
Germany 15 s 15 s 15 s 
Italy 12 18 12 
Luxembourg voluntary 
Netherlands 14-16 14-17 14-17 
United Kingdom voluntary 
TOTAL WEU 
Canada voluntary 
Denmark 9 9 9 
Greece 22 26 24 
Norway 12 15 15 
Portugal 16 24 21-24 
Turkey 20 20 20 
United States voluntary 
TOTAL NON-WEU 
ToTAL NATO 
Sources: 
I. IISS, Military Balance, 1982-83. 
2. NATO press release M-DPC-2 (82) 24, 1st December 1982. 
3. Eight months if served in Germany. 
4. Eighteen months for overseas. 
5. To be eighteen months. 
e = estimate. 
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Total in armed forces 2 
military personnel 
(thousands) 
(e) 
109 
578 
495 
517 
1 
106 
335 
2,141 
81 
31 
186 
40 
91 
769 
2,189 
3,387 
5,528 
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Total armed forces 2 
(military and civilian) 
as percentage 
of active population 
(e) 
2.8 
3.1 
2.5 
2.4 
0.8 
2.6 
2.2 
2.6 
1.0 
1.6 
5.9 
2.5 
2.3 
4.4 
2,9 
3.0 
2.8 
UJ 
0'\ 
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Defence expenditure as percentage of GDP plotted against income per capita- 1981 
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APPENDIX III 
Selected indicators comparing defence contribution with ability to contribute 
Ratio defence Ratio defence Ratio active defence 
spending share/ spending share/ Manpower share/ 
Country GOP share prosperity index share population share 
1981 1982 1983 1981 1982 1983 1981 1982 1983 
Belgium 0.88 0.86 0.85 0.77 0.77 0.94 1.29 1.11 1.11 
France 1.08 1.05 1.03 0.99 0.93 1.05 1.24 1.25 1.23 
Germany 0.89 0.84 0.83 0.71 0.68 0.81 1.02 1.02 1.02 
Italy 0.67 0.63 0.61 1.16 0.98 1.07 0.89 0.91 0.92 
Luxembourg 0.33 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.25 0.32 0.36 0.40 0.33 
Netherlands 0.92 0.81 0.79 1.11 0.74 0.87 0.85 0.90 0.88 
United Kingdom 1.38 1.33 1.31 1.90 1.52 1.59 0.96 0.98 0.97 
Canada 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.55 0.51 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 
Denmark 0.56 0.63 0.61 0.43 0.53 0.59 0.85 0.80 0.80 
Greece 1.50 1.45 1.73 3.60 3.63 4.93 2.07 2.09 2.05 
Norway 0.86 0.75 0.71 0.71 0.58 0.55 1.17 1.15 1.13 
Portugal 1.00 0.92 0.88 4.29 4.13 4.06 0.87 0.94 0.93 
Turkey 1.18 1.21 1.29 7.65 10.20 11.02 1.61 1.62 1.63 
United States 1.37 1.39 1.38 1.27 1.31 1.19 1.28 1.26 1.27 
Japan 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.29 0.32 0.28 0.21 0.21 0.21 
NATO less 
United States 0.95 0.92 0.90 0.97 0.91 1.02 1.09 1.09 1.09 
NATO plus 
Japan less 
United States 0.77 0.76 0.72 0.81 0.79 0.82 0.86 0.87 0.87 
Total NATO 1.15 1.13 1.15 1.12 1.09 1.12 1.16 1.16 1.16 
Total NATO 
plus Japan 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Note : Years are date of Secretary of Defence report. 
" Share " means " share of total for NATO plus Japan ". 
Source: Successive reports to United States Congress by the Secretary of Defence on allied contributions to the common 
defence. 
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APPENDIX IV 
Defence expenditure at constant 1980 prices 1 
S million 
Country 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 (e) 
Belgium 3,799 3,881 3,963 3,999 3,727 
France 24,880 24,974 26,427 27,467 27,387 
Germany 25,724 26,100 26,671 30,419 27,530 
Italy 8,904 9,106 9,588 9,552 9,816 
Luxembourg 43 45 53 55 57 
Netherlands 5,145 5,363 5,264 5,442 5,555 
United Kingdom 25,491 26,015 22,773 27,226 28,016 
TOTAL WEU 93,986 95,484 94,739 104,160 105,815 
Canada 4,581 4,551 4,696 4,867 5,011 
Denmark 1,592 1,597 1,609 1,613 1,662 
Greece 2,555 2,485 2,275 2,796 2,766 
Norway 1,608 1,641 1,667 1,714 1,754 
Portugal 766 789 872 880 859 
Turkey 2,361 2,410 2,461 2,466 2,523 
United States 132,438 137,509 143,860 151,212 163,784 
TOTALNON-WEU 145,901 150,982 157,440 165,548 178,359 
TOTAL NATO 239,887 246,466 252,179 269,708 284,174 
1. Calculated from NATO ftgtues for per capita expenditure. 
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APPENDIX V 
United States ACDA official world military expenditures and arms transfers 
(Military expenditure, constant prices) 
$billion 
March 1981 edition - March 1982 edition- 1978 prices 1977 prices 
NATO Warsaw United NATO Warsaw Soviet Pact States Pact Union 
1970 174.7 129.4 128.8 192.4 150.0 127.8 1970 
1971 166.9 133.0 ll7.9 184.2 153.4 130.2 1971 
1972 169.3 138.0 117.4 187.1 158.9 134.4 1972 
1973 165.2 144.3 ll2.1 183.3 165.8 140.5 1973 
1974 167.8 150.1 ll2.3 185.8 173.1 147.2 1974 
1975 164.9 154.6 108.5 183.3 178.1 151.4 1975 
1976 161.5 161.2 103.3 179.8 185.4 158.2 1976 
1977 167.5 161.7 108.0 186.3 187.2 159.9 1977 
1978 169.1 165.1 108.4 188.8 189.0 161.6 1978 
1979 - - 112.3 195.2 193.6 166.7 1979 
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APPENDIX VI 
Roth-Gienn-Nunn Amendment • 
The full text of the Roth-Glenn-Nunn 
Amendment on NATO Defence Industrial Co-
operation follows : 
Sec. 1122. (a) The Congress finds that-
(1) the United States remains firmly commit-
ted to co-operating closely with its North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereinafter in this 
section referred to as NATO) allies in protect-
ing liberty and maintaining world peace;. 
(2) the financial burden of providing for the 
defence of Western Europe and for the protec-
tion of the interests of NATO member coun-
tries in areas outside the NATO treaty area has 
reached such proportions that new co-operative 
approaches among the United States and its 
NATO allies are required to achieve and main-
tain an adequate collective defence at accept-
able costs; 
(3) the need for a credible ·conventional 
deterrent in Western Europe has long been 
recognised in theory but has never been fully 
addressed in practice; 
(4) a more equitable sharing by NATO 
member countries of both the burdens and the 
technological and economic benefits of the 
common defence would do much to reinvigo-
rate the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
alliance with a restored sense of unity and 
common purpose; 
I. Approved by the United States Senate by 87 votes to I 
on 13th May 1982. 
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(5) a decision to co-ordinate more effectively 
the enormous technological, industrial, and eco-
nomic resources of NATO member countries 
will not only increase the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of NATO military expenditures but 
also provide inducement for the Soviet Union 
to enter a meaningful arms reduction agreement 
so that both Warsaw Pact countries and NATO 
member countries can devote more of their 
energies and resources to peaceful and econo-
mically more beneficial pursuits. 
(b) It is the sense of the Congress that the 
President should propose to the heads of 
government of the NATO member countries 
that the NATO allies of the United States join 
the United States in agreeing-
(1) to co-ordinate more effectively their 
defence efforts and resources to create, at 
acceptable costs, a credible, collective, conven-
tional force for the defence of the North 
Atlantic Treaty area; 
(2) to establish a co-operative defence-indus-
trial effort within Western Europe and between 
Western Europe and North America that would 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
NATO expenditures by providing a larger pro-
duction base while eliminating unnecessary 
duplication of defence-industrial efforts; 
(3) to share more equitably and efficiently 
the financial burdens, as well as the economic 
benefits (including jobs, technology, and trade) 
of NATO defence; and 
(4) to intensify consultations promptly for 
the early achievement of the objectives descri-
bed in clauses (1) through (3). 
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Major United States equipment procured by European 
countries and vice-versa 
A. European equipment being procured by the United States 
- MAN truck for weapon systems in Europe (Germany) 
- MAG-58 armour machine gun 1 (Belgium) 
- 120 mm tank gun 1 (Germany) 
- 5.56 mm squad automatic weapon 1 (Belgium) 
- Muzzle bore sight (training) (United Kingdom) 
B. European equipment being evaluated by the United States 
- Anti-tank weapons : 
LAW-80 
M72-750 
M72A3 
Jupiter 
Panzerfaust III 
Armbrust 
Apilas 
Strim 
- Plessey groundsat rebroadcast radio 
- 90 mm Cockerill Mk III gun 
- Large-calibre bore brushes 
- Underground field shelter, MK-2 
- MH-842 (Markhandler rough terrain forklift truck) 
- 7.62 mm machine gun mount 
- Chemical agent monitoring system 
- Conventional generic mine devices (training mines) 
- HC smoke pots 
- Cartridge, 5.56 mm, ball, practice, Xm 858 
- 4.2 inch mortar sub-calibre training system 
- Cartridge, 50 calibre, ball and tracer, plastic training ammunition 
- DM 82 (hand grenade fuse) 
- FH-380 (personal dosimetry system) 
- Lightweight decontamination system (SANA TOR) 
- Inflatable decoy system for United States Hawk air defence system 
- I 50 kW low noise generator 
- Aerial radiac system 
- I 05 mm kinetic energy practice ammunition 
- Kinetic energy recovery rope 
- Penguin missile 
- PAP-I 04 mine neutralisation system 
- Minesweeper hunter (MSH-1) procurement 
- Searchwater radar 
- Versatile exercise mine (VEM) 
C. United States equipment being procured by European countries 
- Mll3 APC 
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- AN/TSQ-73 missile Minder (a part of the fire direction centre of the improved Hawk 
battery) 
- 1-Hawk (air defence system) 
- 66 mm M72 Law (a squad-level anti-tank weapon) 
- Projectile 155 mm M483A 1 (anti-personnel round delivered by the 155 mm Howitzer) 
1. Produced in the United States. 
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- 2.75 inch rocket (air-delivered anti-personnel round) 
- Flir 
- Tow W/helicopter roof-mounted sight 
- Ml09A3 SP Howitzer 
- Stinger missile (man-portable infrared-homing air defence missile system) 
- Harpoon anti-surface ship missile 
- Submarine-launched Harpoon 
- MK-46 light-light anti-submarine torpedo 
- Sparrow advanced monopulse missile (AMM) AIM/RIM-7M 
- AIM-9L infrared air-to-air missile (The AIM-9L will be employed on the F-14, AV-8, F-16, 
F-15, F/A-18 and the MRCA Tornado. This Sidewinder missile differs from its predeces-
sors principally in having an all-aspect attack capability.) 
- High-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) 
- F/A-18 naval strike fighter aircraft 
- P-3 patrol aircraft Orion 
- Super rapid-blooming oflboard chaff (SRBOC) 
- E2-C early warning aircraft 
- F-16 multinational fighter programme 1 
- Airborne early warning and control (AEW &C) programme 
- Navstar global positioning system (GPS) 1 
- Joint tactical information distribution system (JTIDS) (system adopted for the NATO 
AEW&C programme) 
- Advanced medium-range air-to-air missile 1 
- KC-135 (tanker fleet) re-engining (CFM-56)' 
- Electronic countermeasure simulator 
- Peace Green communications equipment 
- ALQ-131 electronic countermeasure pods 
- ALQ-1 01 electronic countermeasure pods 
I. European coproduction. 
Source: Standardisation of equipment within NATO (report to the United States Congress by Mr. Weinberger, January 
1983). 
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Type 
ICBMs 
Titan II 
Minuteman II 
Minuteman III 
Sub-total 
SLBMs 
Poseidon C-3 
Trident C-4 
Sub-total 
BM total 
Aircraft B-52 
ToTAL 
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Levels of nuclear weapons 
A. Total warheads all systems 
Numbers of nuclear warheads mid-1982 
(Figures rounded to nearest hundred) 
United States Soviet Union 
ICBM 2,100 5,200 
SLBM 4,800 1,800 
Strategic bomber 2,300 300 
Total strategic 1 9,200 7,300 
All other 2 14,700 8,700 
Grand total 3 24,000 16,000 
Sources : l. As in following table. 
2. Deduced by difference. 
3. Hearings United States Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, 13th November 1981. 
B. Levels of United States and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons 
(covered by SALT) 
United States strategic systems (covered by SALT) 
Medium-range Number 
(km) Number of independent 
warheads each 
15,000 52 1 
11,300 450 1 
{ 250 (160 kt) I} 13,000 300 (353 kt- 3 Mk 12A) 
1,052 
4,600 304 10-14 
7,400 216 
520 
1,572 
16,000 312 2 up to 10 or 
12 ALCM 
1,884 
1. On the assumption that the maximum number of warheads are fitted. 
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Assumed total 
number of warheads 
52 
450 
1,650 I 
2,152 
3,040 
4,768 
6,920 
2,280 
9,200 
2. 570 reported in SALT II data base includes 220 in "deep storage". United States figures for March 1983 show a 
further 75 B-52D withdrawn from service. 
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Soviet strategic systems (covered by SALT) 
Maximum-range Number Assumed total Type Number of independent (km) 
warheads each number of warheads 
ICBMs 
SS-11 10,500 570 1 570 
SS-13 10,000 60 1 60 
SS-17 10,000 150 1 or 4 600 I 
SS-18 9-10,500 308 1 or 8 2,464 I 
SS-19 11,000 310 6 or 1 1,500 
Sub-total 1,398 5,200 
SLBMs 
SSN-5 1,120 57 1 57 
SSN-6 2,400-3,000 400 1 400 
SSN-8 8,000 292 1 300 
SSN-17 5,000 12 1 12 
SSN-18 8,000 208 3 1,040 
Sub-total 969 1,800 
BM total 2,367 7,000 
Aircraft Combat radius 
(km) 
Bear Tu-95 5-6,000 105 2-4 210 
Biso'n Mya-4 4-6,000 45 1-2 90 
Sub-total 150 300 
ToTAL 2,498 7.300 
I. On the assumption that the maximum number of warheads are fitted. 
Note: Forces loadings for aircraft deduced from total warheads (rounded to nearest hundred). 
United States forces estimated at mid-1982. 
Source: 
- IISS, Military Balance 1982-83. 
- United States Department of Defence Annual Reports fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 1983. 
- Soviet military power, United States Department of Defence, September 1981. 
- Whence the threat to peace, Soviet Ministry of Defence, January 1982. 
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C. Levels of intermediate-range nuclear weapons of interest to Europe 
Maximum range Assumed Western estimates• 
or combat warheads Weapons Total In range of Soviet claimsl 
radius (km) per system inventory Europe2 
USSR: 
5,000 3 SS-20 351 234 
2,000 1 SS-4 210 170 "land-based" 4,000 1 SS-5 15 496 
1,000 1 SS-12 70 70 
1,000 1 SS-22 100 100 
"sea-based" 18 1,120 1 SS-N-5 57 57 
4,000 3 or 4 Backfire 100 40 
2,800 2 Badger 310 124 
3,100 2 Blinder 125 50 "air-based" 
1,600 2 Fencer 550 110 461 
720 1 Flogger D 550 220 
600 1 Fitter C/D (a) 688 138 
TOTAL 3,126 1,313 975 
NATO inc. France: 
1,900 2 F-111 156 78 
2,000+ 4 or 6 FB-111A 60 60 
750 1 F-4 424 127 
800 1 F-104 290 87 723 
F-16 68 20 
1,000 2 A-6/A-7 68 34 
950 2 Buccaneer 50 25 
720 1 Jaguar 117 58 
1,600 1 Mirage IV-A 34 34 46 
560 2 Super-Etendard 16 8 
720 1 Pershing I 180 180 
4,600 1 Polaris 64 64 64 
3,000 1 M-20 80 80 80 
3,000 10 or 14 Poseidon (b) 40 40 
TOTAL 1,647 895 913 4 
I. IISS Military Balance 1982-83 and NATO NPG communique of23rd March 1983. 
2. Military Balance estimate of numbers available in nuclear role in Europe. 
3. Lev Semeiko in Moscow News, 17th January 1982. 
4. Omitting 55 Vulcan bombers phased out in February 1983. 
(a) The Military Balance 1982-83 also lists 265 Fitter A and 100 Fishbed J-N aircraft under long- and medium-range systems 
for the European theatre but their combat radius of 400 km has excluded them from this table. 
(b) 400 Poseidon warheads are assigned to SACEUR but are also included in strategic table B. 
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D. Historical levels of SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 missiles 
' 
Total Total Total Total Total Total warheads Year ofSS-4 SS-20 
missiles warheeds 1 yield equivalent in range of Notes 
and SS-5 MT2 megatons 3 Europe 4 
1962 200 - 200 200 200 200 200 Period of 
SS-4 and 
SS-5 
ild-up 
1963-1971 700 - 700 700 700 700 525 
1972-1976 600 - 600 600 600 600 450 
1977 600 (20) 620 660 609 617 440 
1978 590 100 690 890 635 675 642 Start of 
SS-20 de-
ployment 
1979 590 120 710 950 644 692 682 
1980 440 160 600 920 512 576 650 
1981 380 230 610 1,070 483 575 745 
19825 230 324 554 1,200 376 504 820 
Source: Successive editions of IISS Military Balance. 
1. Assuming 3 warheads on all SS-20 missiles, but ignoring any reloads. 
2. Assuming 1 MT on SS-4, SS-5 warheads; 0.15 MT on SS-20 warheads. 
3. Total of Y~where Y is yield of each warhead in MT. 
4. Figures from NATO NPG communique of 30th November 1982. 
5. Assuming ! SS-4, 5 and ~ SS-20 in range of Europe. 
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The Assembly, 
APPENDIX IX 
RESOLUTION 15 • 
on the participation of observers in certain meetings 
of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
DOCUMENT 94 7 
Considering the interests of member states of NATO which are not members ofWEU, 
DECIDES 
1. That the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments may invite observers to attend its 
. meetings from member states of NATO which are not members ofWEU; 
2. That such observers shall have the right to speak. 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 18th June 1959 during the first part of the fifth ordinary session (6th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum : see the report tabled by Mr. Patijn on behalf of the Presidential Committee (Document 130 
and Addendum). 
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